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INTRODUCTION 
The day eventually came when Jennifer Cramblett, like 
many other American women, lovingly looked at her partner and 
decided it was time to “start a family.”1 Cramblett, however, like 
many other prospective mothers, faced certain challenges that 
threatened to thwart her desire to biologically reproduce. Luck-
ily Cramblett, as an economically privileged prospective 
mother,2 discovered that the market would provide what Mother 
Nature would otherwise deprive—the genetic material and the 
technological means required for her to produce biologically re-
lated progeny. Her salvation was the Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART) marketplace, a space where she could pur-
chase sperm or eggs, or even rent a womb if necessary to achieve 
her goal.3 Cramblett’s ultimate choice—to purchase genetic ma-
terial from a sperm donor—would have been an unremarkable, 
standard ART transaction, but for a small administrative error 
that had major racial implications. Although Cramblett re-
quested and purchased sperm from Donor 380, a blond, blue-
eyed white male, the clerk handling the transaction misheard 
her request and sent her sperm from Donor 330, a brown-haired, 
brown-eyed Black male.4 The clerk’s mistake erupted into a com-
 
 1. See Complaint ¶¶ 7–8, Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, LLC, No. 
2014-L-010159 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 29, 2014), 2014 WL 4853400 [hereinafter First 
Complaint] (discussing Cramblett’s four-year committed relationship to 
Amanda Zinkon and the couple’s desire to have two children). Numerous schol-
ars have discussed the coercive pull of American family norms which posit that 
true success lies in achieving a nuclear family. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Stag-
ing the Family, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 629–30 (2013); Melissa Murray, The Net-
worked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregiv-
ers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 387 (2008). The implicit assumption that accompanies 
these family norms is that a biologically-created nuclear family is ideal. 
 2. In vitro fertilization (IVF) is typically not covered by insurance and is 
prohibitively expensive for low-income Americans. See Cynthia R. Daniels & 
Erin Heidt-Forsythe, Gendered Eugenics and the Problematic of Free Market 
Reproductive Technologies: Sperm and Egg Donation in the United States, 37 
SIGNS 719, 721 (2012) (explaining that IVF services involving gamete donors 
have no regulations limiting price which results in exorbitant costs for consum-
ers); see also Alicia Armstrong & Torie C. Plowden, Ethnicity and Assisted Re-
productive Technologies, 9 CLINICAL PRAC. 651, 652 (2012) (noting only three 
states have insurance mandates that cover ART services).  
 3. For a general discussion of services currently available in the ART mar-
ket and potential future technologies, see HENRY T. GREELY, THE END OF SEX 
AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION (2016). 
 4. First Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 9–10, 16. 
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mercial controversy, a family controversy, and a racial contro-
versy all in one.5 Cramblett, as a member of a monoracial blond, 
white lesbian couple, had contracted for the chance to form a 
white nuclear family.6 While she ultimately opted to give birth 
to the mixed race baby now actively growing in her womb, Cram-
blett also filed suit for the clerk’s racial mistake, as she effec-
tively had been denied the “benefit-of-the-bargain”7 she con-
tracted for in her ART transaction.8 
What was the “benefit-of-the-bargain” in Cramblett’s case? 
The answer to this question spurred a firestorm of controversy, 
as it is seems impossible to respond without violating certain 
colorblindness norms.9 Cramblett conceded that race was the 
gravamen of her complaint as, despite the multiple other differ-
ences between the sperm sample she was given and the sperm 
sample she had chosen, the racial difference between the two 
was the preeminent source of injury in her mind, the only source 
of her damages.10 Moreover, simple compensation was not 
 
 5. Id. ¶ 22 (discussing injury caused by bearing a “beautiful, obviously 
mixed race, baby girl”).  
 6. For a discussion of the monoracial family norm and its influence on 
white families, see ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS: 
RHINELANDER V. RHINELANDER AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY 17–
19 (2013). See also Huntington, supra note 1, at 591 (discussing the racialized 
nature of the nuclear family norm). 
 7. Benefit-of-the-Bargain Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 8. See First Complaint, supra note 1. 
 9. Multiple authors have analyzed the race-based claims raised in Cram-
blett but they have not investigated the discursive origins and impact of her 
claims, and how they reflect standard ART marketing practices. See Alberto 
Bernabe, Do Black Lives Matter? Race as a Measure of Injury in Tort Law, ST. 
MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 41 (2016) (discussing moral deficits in 
plaintiff’s race-based wrongful birth claims); R.A. Lenhardt, The Color of Kin-
ship, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2071, 2079 (2017) (using the Cramblett case to call for 
greater attention to the way race shapes family formation decisions and family 
law); Suzanne Lenon & Danielle Peers, ‘Wrongful’ Inheritance: Race, Disability 
and Sexuality in Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, 25 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 
141 (2017) (discussing moral deficits in plaintiff’s race-based wrongful birth 
claims). By more closely examining the role of race-based “private preferences” 
in ART family-formation decisions, we uncover critical social understandings 
linking reproductive freedom and freedom of contract.  
 10. See First Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 20. Cramblett received a twenty-
three-page description of each sperm donor and used this description to select 
her final choice. Id. ¶ 9. However, the racial difference between donor 380 and 
330 was the only difference she decided was significant enough to trigger a law-
suit. See Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 865, 868 
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enough in her opinion. The sperm clinic was apologetic and re-
imbursed the money she had paid for her sample.11 However, to 
Cramblett this was scant compensation. True compensation for 
the loss of a monoracial family was impossible to measure, she 
suggested, but in any event, she was entitled to far more than a 
simple refund of her expenses for the clinic’s services.12 Cram-
blett’s suit therefore forced the court to answer questions it was 
likely eager to avoid: Should we enforce contracts that purport 
to exchange race? Does race have an exchange value? If the an-
swer is yes, how can this conclusion be justified under the logic 
of the United States’ so-called post-racial, colorblind ethos? How 
can contracts for race exist in a society ostensibly marching to-
wards racial equality? 
Free market champions13 joined by strong reproductive 
rights advocates,14 tend to endorse Cramblett’s right to sue and 
 
(N.D. Ill. 2017) (citing First Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 16) (seeking compensa-
tion for external pressures associated with an unplanned “transracial” parent 
child relationship).  
 11. First Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 20 (discussing clinic’s apology letter 
with check refunding cost of six vials of sperm purchased in September 2014). 
The clinic did not refund all of the money she paid for its services. Id. 
 12. See generally id. ¶¶ 17, 23–25 (discussing additional race-related inju-
ries and how happiness was “replaced with anger, disappointment and fear”). 
Cramblett also noted the racial mistake’s secondary consequences as she and 
her partner wanted to have two children by the same sperm donor. Id. ¶ 9. The 
couple only discovered the racial mix-up when they attempted to purchase more 
of their chosen donor’s sperm to hold in reserve for Amanda Zinkon’s expected 
later pregnancy. Id. ¶¶ 14–16. At that point, the couple faced the Hobbesian 
choice of choosing the same donor or having children of “different races” in their 
family.  
 13. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 4 (1994) (arguing broadly that “individuals 
should be free to use [ART resources] or not as they choose, without government 
restriction, unless strong justification for limiting them can be established”); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Gender, and Genetic Technologies: A New Reproduc-
tive Dystopia?, 34 SIGNS 783, 798 (2009) (collecting sources and demonstrating 
how arguments about women’s reproductive freedom are used as a cover to pre-
vent regulation of the ART industry). 
 14. Some scholars have condemned racial categorization practices in gam-
ete markets but argue we should not prohibit the use of race because of repro-
ductive freedom concerns. See, e.g., Hawley Fogg-Davis, Navigating Race in the 
Market for Human Gametes, 31 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 17 (2001) (arguing that 
racial categorization limits individual freedom and encourages racial stereotyp-
ing but declining to forbid its use); cf. Dov Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race, 22 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 5 (2011) [hereinafter Fox, Choosing] (expressing con-
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receive damages. In their view, Cramblett is merely using the 
courts to vindicate a genuinely held and innocent private prefer-
ence the market offered her based on race.15 Indeed, since its in-
ception, the American ART market has represented the right to 
parenthood as being first and foremost about consumer choice.16 
Parents are encouraged to select everything for their children, 
from eye color to height, from intelligence level to sense of hu-
mor, as they search for these traits in donors.17 Race understand-
ably is one of several significant characteristics. For another 
 
cern about racial categorization’s symbolic effects in the ART market but de-
clining to forbid its use). Fox is not an enthusiastic supporter of the use of race 
in this fashion, but sees race as an established and perhaps intractable compo-
nent of some consumers’ ART selection decisions. See Dov Fox, Thirteenth 
Amendment Reflections on Abortion, Surrogacy, and Race Selection, 104 COR-
NELL L. REV. ONLINE 114, 135–36 (2019). 
 15. See Fox, Choosing, supra note 14, at 10 (describing the search for same-
race gametes and same-race dating partners as an innocent search for shared 
culture); see also Julie Shapiro, What Damages When a Sperm Bank Errs? (Oct. 
4, 2013), https://julieshapiro.wordpress.com/2014/10/04/what-damages-when-a 
-sperm-bank-errs [https://perma.cc/7ZY2-NQXU] (asserting Cramblett’s desire 
for racial sameness in her child is similar to wanting a deaf child if you are deaf); 
Barbara Spiegel, It’s Not Racist To Want Your Child To Look Like You, TIME 
(Oct. 9, 2014), http://time.com/3482873/lesbian-couple-sues-sperm-bank-racism 
[https://perma.cc/EHV7-U3XV] (comparing Cramblett’s claim to that of con-
sumer-mother with dwarfism traumatized by clinic’s apparent accident causing 
her to be impregnated with sperm from a standard height donor); cf. Elizabeth 
F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and 
Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1347, 1382 (2009) (declining to analyze parent-
child relationships but arguing that a mix of complicated factors motivate same-
race choices in intimate relationships and legislation should not attempt to di-
rectly disrupt the exercise of choice in this arena). 
 16. See generally GREELY, supra note 3 (charting various ways in which the 
ART market will create more complicated ethical questions based on the power 
ever-expanding consumer choice plays in the expansion of the ART market); 
Fogg-Davis, supra note 14, at 15 (noting consumers are invited to view donor 
profiles that allow one to choose between certain “vital health” information to 
“genetically irrelevant” items). Donor profiles ostensibly offer consumers their 
choice of genetic donors based on hair and eye color, educational history, hob-
bies, and personal goals. For specific examples, see Become an Egg Donor, CAL. 
CRYOBANK, https://cryobank.com/services/become-an-egg-donor/ [https://perma 
.cc/7MDG-7VT3] (describing information required to qualify as a donor); STE-
PANKA, Make Money Donating Your Eggs!, YOUTUBE (May 13, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Is8yzODvM2U (showing a video account 
from a six-time egg donor noting that intake process requires disclosure of SAT 
scores, hobbies, college major, and various talents). 
 17. See Fogg-Davis, supra note 14, at 15 (outlining the various donor char-
acteristics shared with consumers). 
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group, Cramblett’s decision to purchase white sperm is not about 
race per se, but rather, reflects a parent’s normal desire to have 
genetic children that look like her.18 A child of a different race, 
they argue, frustrates this very reasonable expectation.19 This 
group also argues that racial sameness has secondary value: it 
hides the fact of the ART procedure, as well as forestalls ques-
tions about family integrity.20 This race-based aesthetic-same-
ness argument may strike some of Cramblett’s defenders as par-
ticularly innocuous, as they themselves or people close to them 
may have entered family-formation contracts to secure same 
race children. Cramblett also rightly complained that she was 
now faced with new cultural and political challenges, as she was 
now shouldering the burden of unexpectedly raising a mixed race 
child.21 While the bare honesty of Cramblett’s complaint triggers 
embarrassment for some parties, given its violation of social 
norms, they still believe she is entitled to damages.22  
Many equality scholars, in contrast, view Cramblett’s case 
with dismay, arguing it reveals the lie of contemporary claims of 
colorblindness and post-raciality.23 Numerous scholars have crit-
icized our culture’s naturalization of gamete banks’ practice of 
 
 18. Cramblett’s response to the mix-up certainly was telling and suggestive 
of the larger problem, as was the ART clerk’s response. Both parties abided by 
the monoracial family norm. The clerk sought to confirm what she perceived to 
be a strange request: “[The receptionist] asked Jennifer if she had requested an 
African American donor to which she replied, ‘No, why would I request that? 
My partner and I are Caucasian. You know that from our profiles.’” First Com-
plaint, supra note 1, ¶ 16. 
 19. See, e.g., Fox, Choosing, supra note 14, at 16.  
 20. See MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, WHAT MATTERS MOST IN AN AGE OF RE-
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND UN-
WED PARENTS 97 (2001) (rejecting race-blind gamete donation as a viable option 
because people have myriad reasons for rejecting minority gametes, most sig-
nificantly aesthetic sameness); Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. 
L. REV. 149, 201 (2017) (sympathetically describing the case of Andrews v. Keltz, 
838 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (Sup. Ct. 2007), in which a donor mixup led to a couple 
“‘rais[ing] a child that is not . . . the same race, nationality, or color’ as they 
are”). 
 21. Interview with anonymous ART consumer (Sept. 2017) (on file with au-
thor). 
 22. Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 865 (N.D. Ill. 
2017). Cramblett is not the first plaintiff to file a claim of this nature. For other 
cases, see infra Part II. 
 23. See DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRO-
DUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 267–70 (1997) (discussing the way ART 
figures white mothers as legitimate procreators in need of assistance compared 
 
 
2382 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2375 
 
categorizing, pricing, and marketing sperm and eggs based on 
race.24 They also have criticized the way the American ART mar-
ket naturalizes the desire for a monoracial family.25 Unper-
suaded by innocent aesthetic-preference arguments, these schol-
ars press American ART consumers to more deeply probe their 
motivations. Specifically, these scholars argue that the market-
ing of racially marked gametes in the American ART market is 
an explicit, contemporary example of racial commodification.26 
They note that race is not just one minor characteristic among 
many highlighted in gamete donor profiles; rather, it is a consti-
tutive element of the donor being offered. ART marketing prac-
tices make race a commodity, a thing of value, whether it is de-
scribed as racial essence, racial identity, or racial status.27 In 
their view, Cramblett’s case raises the stakes, as her suit asks 
the courts to condone the existence of markets in racial essence, 
bolstering their legitimacy.28 For these reasons, they argue, the 
 
to poor Black mothers); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER’S EGG 230 (1995) 
(same); Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: 
ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 64 (2003) (ar-
guing that racial classification in ART sends a message of white superiority); 
Roberts, supra note 13, at 789 (arguing current ART racial categorization prac-
tices send a social message that indicates white children are of higher value). 
 24. See sources cited supra note 23.  
 25. See Roberts, supra note 13, at 790 (criticizing ART market develop-
ments that radically constrict the choices of people of color). 
 26. See sources cited supra note 23. 
 27. The racial products available in the United States are also sold to con-
sumers from foreign jurisdictions, increasing the risk that American racial 
norms are being exported. See Nicky Hudson et al., Cross-Border Reproductive 
Care: A Review of the Literature, 22 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 673 (2011) 
(describing reproductive tourists coming to the United States as roughly four 
percent of the domestic ART market). Latin Americans, Europeans, and Cana-
dians are some of the largest foreign consumer groups. Id. at 678. However, the 
largest impact American consumers’ racial norms have is on the global market, 
which is organized in substantial part by Americans’ celebration of European 
whiteness. See, e.g., AMY SPEIER, FERTILITY HOLIDAYS: IVF TOURISM AND THE 
REPRODUCTION OF WHITENESS (2016) (discussing American demand for white-
ness as powering Czechoslovakian market for ART consumers); Carolin Schurr, 
From Biopolitics to Bioeconomies: The ART of (Re-)Producing White Futures in 
Mexico’s Surrogacy Market, 35 SOC’Y & SPACE 241 (2017) (discussing American 
demand for whiteness as shaping Mexican ART market). 
 28. See Lenhardt, supra note 9, at 2073–74. 
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courts should refuse to enforce contracts that exchange race and 
dismiss Cramblett’s claim.29 
The court’s steps in assessing Cramblett’s suit seem largely 
preordained, choreographed by existing legal doctrine, but the 
dance the law outlines does not speak to the core normative 
questions that must ultimately decide the case and, indeed, are 
foremost in most Americans’ moral calculations. Specifically, 
both contract and tort law seem amenable to providing Cram-
blett relief, but for the hanging question of whether public policy 
considerations prevent recovery on a contract for the sale of a 
racial product. For example, the clinic’s failure to exercise due 
care in maintaining the racial identification tags for the samples 
could be legally characterized as negligence.30 Alternatively, the 
clinic’s failure to provide Cramblett with the racially distinct 
sperm sample identified in her purchase contract could consti-
tute a material breach of a contract term.31 Yet, if a court deter-
mined that our antidiscrimination commitments prevent race 
from being treated as a material consideration, these potential 
tort and contract claims would be summarily declared void.32 
Without clear legal norms outlining the role of race in the com-
mercial marketplace, and no moral or ethical guideposts for re-
solving such questions, a court is rudderless in resolving the 
Cramblett dispute.33  
There is much to be learned from the Cramblett case, as it 
lays bare the numerous naturalized assumptions at the heart of 
the ART market regarding racial commodification, reproductive 
freedom, and freedom of contract. Once these assumptions are 
 
 29. Additionally, the sale of race, more than in any other market, has clear 
social stratification implications with real wealth effects. Consumers in the 
gamete market are typically wealthy and white. See Daniels & Heidt-Forsythe, 
supra note 2, at 721. The race-based commercial exchanges made in the ART 
market effectively ensure that white wealth remains in the hands of monoracial 
white families. 
 30. Sperm banks are very conscious of customer anxieties about racial mix 
ups and use color coded caps to classify and organize sperm. Black sperm vials 
have a black cap, Asian sperm receives a yellow cap, and white sperm a white 
cap. Seline Szkupinski Quiroga, Blood Is Thicker than Water: Policing Donor 
Insemination and the Reproduction of Whiteness, 22 HYPATIA 143, 150 (2007). 
 31. Bernabe, supra note 9 at 48–66 (cataloging Cramblett’s possible claims 
and their likelihood of success).  
 32. Specifically, if race cannot be exchanged there is no material breach of 
contract, and no breach of the duty of care necessary for a negligence claim.  
 33. Fogg-Davis, supra note 14, at 14–16.  
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laid bare, we can better assess whether a society ostensibly com-
mitted to racial equality can allow buyers and sellers in the gam-
ete market to continue forming contracts that purport to ex-
change race. Once these assumptions are laid bare, the State’s 
role in structuring family formation practices is rendered visible; 
only then can we openly assess the State’s expected future role 
in supporting the formation of families. Yet this process of de-
familiarization and re-evaluation is bound to prove unsettling, 
as challenges that threaten ART freedoms and the primacy of 
the monoracial family are rare. Challenges of this nature test 
the depths of our commitment to racial equality and, further, re-
quire a ranking of privacy and freedom of contract against equal-
ity concerns in ways we historically have sought to avoid.34  
To begin this discovery process, a reader must be prepared 
to honestly engage her core assumptions about race and its his-
toric and contemporary role as a commodity in American society. 
Indeed, Americans know our early economy was organized at its 
core on the principle of racial commodification, as Black persons, 
Latinx persons, and Asians were racialized in particular ways to 
ensure their forced participation in developing the industrial 
and agricultural economy of the United States.35 Indeed, racial 
commodities have played a key, disturbing role in the United 
 
 34. The court never reaches these questions in the Cramblett case because 
the plaintiff failed to properly negotiate multiple procedural rules. Cramblett’s 
original complaint was filed in a trial court in Cook County, Illinois. Her com-
plaint alleged breach of warranty and wrongful birth. Both claims were dis-
missed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Her second amended com-
plaint, filed in DuPage County, alleged multiple statutory causes of action, as 
well as breach of warranty, breach of contract, negligence, and gross negligence. 
Cramblett’s claims were dismissed again for technical defects; however, her 
common law and breach of contract claims were dismissed without prejudice 
and plaintiff was given leave to file another amended complaint within forty-
five days. Because Cramblett did not re-file and instead sought to file an iden-
tical claim in federal court, the Illinois Appellate Court dismissed all claims 
with prejudice effectively ending the litigation without any substantive or de-
tailed review of her claims. For a full summary of the procedural history and 
resolution of the case, see Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 
3d 865 (N.D. Ill. 2017).  
 35. Authorities on this topic are too numerous to include here. See generally 
Ernesto Hernández-López, Global Migrations and Imagined Citizenship: Ex-
amples from Slavery, Chinese Exclusion, and When Questioning Birthright Cit-
izenship, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 255 (2008) (juxtaposing the racialization 
and exploitative labor practices used to exploit Chinese, African American, and 
Mexican laborers and the consequences for citizenship status). 
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States’ formation story.36 However, Americans may be surprised 
to discover that in a country fundamentally shaped by the dan-
gers of racial commodification, there is no clear normative, con-
stitutional principle that prevents private parties from selling 
racially marked material.37 The explicit racial commodification 
in gamete markets forces the question: Is there harm in classi-
fying and selling genetic material based on race?38 This Article 
begins to answer that question by using our understanding of 
racial formation to examine the practices of the State, gamete 
sellers, and ART consumers as they purport to exchange race.39 
As we examine what parties promise and prohibit, and what con-
sumers say and do, we learn a great deal about the role of race 
in personal identity and in family formation. Our analysis will 
also take the form of a functionalist inquiry, as this inquiry al-
lows us to determine whether race is deployed in the ART mar-
ket for a legitimate purpose or instead operates in ways that re-
instantiate race-based subordination.40 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. The most explicit bar on racial commodification is found under Title 
VII’s race-based employment discrimination protections. Employment discrim-
ination cases are beyond the scope of this Article, but they are consistent with 
and derivative of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection law cases em-
phasizing the importance of dignity and equal access. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zema 
Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 744 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting employer’s claim that a 
segregated sales force was required for customer service purposes); Ferrill v. 
Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 477 (11th Cir. 1999) (describing a case where 
an employer was not permitted to terminate a Black worker after racially spe-
cific “get out the vote calls” were no longer needed). Unfortunately, Title VII’s 
prohibition on racial commodification is also routinely ignored by certain par-
ties, including media entities and healthcare industry employers. See, e.g., Ki-
mani Paul-Emile, Patients’ Racial Preferences and the Medical Culture of Ac-
commodation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 462, 464 (2012) (discussing hospital doctors’ 
informal practice of respecting patients’ racial preferences in assigning doctors); 
Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and 
Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1–6 (2007) (discussing the ex-
istence of racial commodification dynamics when the entertainment industry 
issues race-specific casting requests). 
 38. Fogg-Davis, supra note 14, at 13 (arguing the gamete selection process 
encourages consumers to engage in racial stereotyping). 
 39. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S, at 62–63, 66–67 (2d ed. 1994).  
 40. Fogg-Davis, supra note 14, at 16 (“[S]hould each individual donor have 
the freedom to describe his racial identity using language that transcends the 
sperm bank’s racial boxes? And how are racial descriptions of sperm donors re-
lated to the consumer’s goal of creating a baby?”). 
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This Article will also call upon the reader to challenge the 
current insistent drive to treat reproductive freedom as conso-
nant with, and including, an unrestrained right to freedom of 
contract. This right to “freedom of contract” in the reproductive 
realm is key to the current assertion that consumers should be 
able to buy any genetic material they desire for their children, 
packaged in any form, including racially classified genetic mate-
rial.41 The Cramblett case is a flash point for this controversy 
because no such right to reproductive freedom currently exists.42 
Rather, the broad reproductive choices Americans are offered in 
the ART market result from policymakers’ inattention and inde-
cision, a resulting absence of legal regulation,43 and the failure 
to fully engage with the philosophical question of what the right 
to procreate means.44 As a point of contrast, sperm and egg mar-
kets in foreign countries are structured in ways that constrain 
choice without being challenged as fundamental bars to the ex-
ercise of reproductive rights.45 Even in the United States, con-
sumer freedom has always been understood as situated within a 
 
 41. See Yehezkel Margalit, Artificial Insemination from Donor (AID)–From 
Status to Contract and Back Again?, 21 B.U. J. SCI. TECH. L., 69, 69–71 (2015) 
(describing a shift from status and public ordering toward freedom of contract 
and private ordering in familial relationships). 
 42. See generally MICHELLE N. MEYER, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF 
GOV’T, STATES’ REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: 
WHAT DOES THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ALLOW? (2009), http://research 
.policyarchive.org/20311.pdf [https://perma.cc/A974-6AUG] (explaining that 
neither the right to contraception nor the right to abortion directly supports 
advocates’ claim that there is a constitutional right to unencumbered ART us-
age); Radhika Rao, How (Not) To Regulate ARTs Technology: Lessons from Oc-
tomom, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 313, 315 (2011) (“[T]here is not . . . a general 
right to use assisted reproductive technology as a matter of reproductive auton-
omy, but there may be a limited right . . . to use ARTs as a matter of reproduc-
tive equality.”). 
 43. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Welcome to the Wild West: Protecting Access 
to Cross Border Fertility Care in the United States, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 349, 362–63 (2012) (describing a lack of regulation in the American ART 
market). 
 44. The right to reproduce is not freestanding; it should be understood as a 
time-dependent, context-specific, unique amalgam that is shaped by cultural 
attitudes towards conjugal childlessness, beliefs about the difficulty of procre-
ating, gendered subjectivities, law, and the parties’ understanding of technol-
ogy. See Venetia Kantsa, Preface to (IN)FERTILE CITIZENS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES 13 (Ve-
netia Kantsa et al. eds., 1st ed. 2015).  
 45. See infra Part I.C.5 for a discussion of Turkey, Israel, and Britain. Can-
ada also faces significant restrictions resulting in roughly ninety percent of 
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network of necessary limitations, yet we still perceive the exer-
cise of our marketplace rights as meaningful.46  
Throughout this Article readers will also be called upon to 
engage with the social mechanisms that give racial inequality 
permanence in an ostensibly post-racial society. The Cramblett 
case illustrates how the work of former de jure segregation can 
now frequently be accomplished by so called “private” racial pref-
erences enforced and enacted through private contracts. Stated 
simply, there is no need for compulsory anti-miscegenation stat-
utes to maintain racial purity and racial covenants establishing 
racially segregated communities when the same results can be 
achieved through voluntary private decisions, a regime of “atom-
ized inequality.”47 Indeed, today the same anti-miscegenation 
goals are achieved through strategic marketing ploys and claims 
about individual consumers’ innocent “private” preference for a 
monoracial family.48 Moreover, now that consumers want courts 
to legally enforce ART contracts for the exchange of race, courts 
are being invited to instantiate a new era of legally-subsidized 
racial inequality.49 Consumers are poised to demand that courts 
recognize the legal right to procure a monoracial family.50 This 
 
sperm used being purchased from foreign jurisdictions. See Ruth Graham, Don’t 
Be Fooled by Justin Trudeau’s Virility—Canada Is in a Sperm Crisis!, SLATE 
(Mar. 8, 2016), https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/03/canadas-sperm-crisis 
-forces-citizens-to-find-seed-elsewhere.html [https://perma.cc/97CF-29EC]. The 
point is that various countries’ restrictions may motivate reproductive tourism, 
but consumers in restrictive countries do not complain that these impediments 
have wholly deprived them their key reproductive rights. They may not agree 
with these restrictions, but they recognize the state’s strong interest in regulat-
ing ART markets. 
 46. For example, the United States prohibits the commercial sale of human 
organs. See Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in As-
sisted Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in 
Human Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 257, 271 (2002). Some will argue 
that formal legal restrictions hide the true economic reality that even these sup-
posedly market-exempt items are still available for sale.  
 47. R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Ra-
cial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875, 886 
(1998) (introducing the concept of “atomized inequality”).  
 48. Schurr, supra note 27, at 242 (explaining that there is a new “liberal 
eugenics” driven by consumer choices in a new bioeconomy). 
 49. Deborah Zalense, The Intersection of Contract Law, Reproductive Tech-
nology, and the Market: Families in the Age of ART, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 
479–84 (2017) (highlighting several breach of contract cases arising from ART). 
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discussion challenges legal scholars to examine how current pri-
vate market choices are the consequence of prior de jure institu-
tional arrangements. When we create new legal rights that allow 
individuals to vindicate these so-called modern “private” racial 
preferences, law is effectively being asked to subsidize the pri-
vate discriminatory preferences that it created on the front end.  
This Article is also part of a larger project that will examine 
the ways race is framed in an era that tends to uncritically cele-
brate neoliberalism and the promise of the free market econ-
omy.51 Critics have raised concerns about neoliberalism’s sway 
precisely because the framework encourages us to believe all 
things of value can be conceptualized as market commodities 
and all personal relations can be understood through the frame 
of market relations.52 Parenthood and family are more easily 
subordinated to this framework as children are procured 
through ART, adoption, and other baby market arrangements.53 
In this baby market, race becomes one more commodity bought 
and sold, a thing easily procured as a means to perfect family 
relations.54 Certainly, using market frames for certain matters 
does effect a certain kind of interpretive violence; yet market 
framing also provides a valuable discursive opportunity to un-
derstand race and family through a different lens. There is a way 
in which market analyses squarely confront us with core ethical 
 
 51. Randolph Hohle, The Color of Neoliberalism: The “Modern Southern 
Businessman” and Postwar Alabama’s Challenge to Racial Desegregation, 27 
SOC. F. 142, 143 (2012) (describing the relationship between race and neoliber-
alism). 
 52. See Laura Mamo, Queering the Fertility Clinic, 34 J. MED. HUM. 227, 
231 (2013) (discussing the way consumer purchases in the fertility market are 
represented as self-realization through consumption, a common theme under a 
neoliberal framework); Roberts, supra note 13, at 785 (“[D]iversion of attention 
away from social causes and solutions reinforces privatization, the hallmark of 
a neoliberal state that seeks to reduce social welfare programs while promoting 
the free market conditions conducive to capital accumulation. Thus, reproduc-
tive health policies involving women at opposite ends of the reproductive hier-
archy play an important role in the neoliberal state’s transfer of services from 
the welfare state to the private realm of family and market.”).  
 53. See Zalense, supra note 49, at 419–20. 
 54. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Reproductive Tourism: Equality Concerns in the 
Global Market for Fertility Services, 27 LAW & INEQ. 277, 277–309 (2009) (dis-
cussing the way market transactions for ART are romanticized by language 
about privacy and family relations). 
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and normative questions.55 When we bar or permit certain prod-
ucts to be sold, we reveal that the market does have a soul. We 
make stark ethical decisions when we decide what we will recog-
nize as commodities and whether we will ask for government as-
sistance in enforcing contracts based on certain commercial un-
derstandings.56 Understanding Americans’ relationship to race 
in the market, and understanding how race continues to be 
bought and sold in American society will give us great insight 
into the thus-far elusive social norms that prevent us from at-
taining racial equality. 
Increasingly, it is clear that a market-based approach to un-
derstanding race is essential in thinking about family formation 
in American society.57 Families that are unable to biologically 
reproduce are now turning to various family formation arrange-
ments for acquiring children, such as adoption, surrogacy, gam-
ete purchase, etc., that are shaped by market pressures.58 We 
must examine the relationship between the various markets for 
acquiring children and why these markets have formed.59 Addi-
tionally, we must understand the role that race plays in these 
 
 55. Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Moral Views of Market Society, 33 
ANN. REV. SOC. 285, 295 (2007) (explaining that markets are cultural products 
and can be analyzed to identify cultural norms). 
 56. This approach is sometimes referred to as economic sociology. Id.  
 57. Dov Fox, Race Sorting in Family Formation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 55, 60 (2015) 
(describing how some private adoption agencies “openly make placement deci-
sions based primarily on race and prominently highlight the racial backgrounds 
of adoptive children in online advertising and other promotional materials, 
while charging higher fees to adopt white children than black ones” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. It is useful to think of the ART market as contiguous with the domestic 
and international adoption market, as race plays an important market struc-
turing and pricing role in these domains as well. Michele Goodwin, The Free-
Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
61, 62–64 (2006) (explaining how race and ethnicity currently structure the in-
ternational and domestic adoption market). Scholars like Susan Appleton have 
observed that the ART market and the adoption market have become integrally 
related, as both are seen as near equivalents as viable options for parents inter-
ested in securing children. Specifically, parents frustrated by the challenges of 
securing a white child through adoption may turn to the ART market. Con-
versely, ART consumers may turn to adoption when their chance to have a bio-
logical child fails. See generally Susan Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Repro-
ductive Technology, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 410 (2004) (discussing legal 
structures that create incentives for ART as the more “private” unregulated op-
tion as compared to adoption). Additionally, the racial segregation and selection 
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markets and discover what these insights about race markets 
teach us about our broader racial equality norms. The need is 
urgent. Our understanding of equality has always, in large part, 
been articulated through the language of freedom of access and 
freedom of contract;60 however, that articulation process is not 
finished. We must examine the symbolic and normative power 
commercial markets play in our conversations about race, and 
also structure legal regimes that interrogate and subvert these 
commercial market exchanges when they threaten our racial 
equality goals.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I, Packaging Race in 
the ART Market, probes the racial categorization practices cur-
rently used in the United States gamete market to provide a bet-
ter account of what is actually being exchanged when parties 
purport to sell racially marked ova and sperm. After exploring 
the high risk of fraud, confusion, and potentially misleading 
speech, Part I demonstrates why gamete banks’ current racial 
categorization practices could thrust courts back into discredited 
legal arguments about racial purity, racial fraud, and blood lines 
that our legal system abandoned as distasteful after the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Part II, Pur-
chasing Racial Essence: Understanding the Benefit of the Bar-
gain, probes customer preference claims about race to determine 
what it is consumers believe they are buying when they purchase 
race in the ART market. Close examination of customers’ argu-
ments reveals a fundamental anxiety about “ideal” family per-
formance—concerns that reflect the residual influence of anti-
miscegenation norms, regressive femininity and masculinity 
constructs, and a desire to outsource the challenges associated 
with achieving racial equality.61 Careful review of these argu-
ments further suggests that buying patterns for racial products 
in the United States ART market do not reflect the celebratory 
exercise of consumer freedom, but rather a profound anxiety 
about the existing racial order in the United States. Part III, 
 
norms in the adoption market are identical with adoption agencies sorting chil-
dren by race and allowing white parents to reject minority children on a racial 
basis. Yet the market also has certain racial equality norms. For example, in 
contrast to the ART market, if a parent wishes to adopt a multi-racial or minor-
ity child, those interests are required by statute to be honored and fairly evalu-
ated. Goodwin, supra, at 62–64. 
 60. Davison M. Douglas, Contract Rights and Civil Rights, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 1541, 1542–45 (2002) (discussing the ways in which freedom of contract 
has shaped race-based civil rights jurisprudence).  
 61. See infra Parts II.C, E. 
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Charting a Way Forward, considers the approaches federal and 
state governments could use if they attempt to disrupt current 
racial marketing practices in the ART industry. Part III explores 
approaches that function as direct prohibitions as well as more 
gradual, indirect incentive measures. Part III concludes by ex-
ploring issues that may be raised about the various regulatory 
approaches, and argues that our racial equality guarantees man-
date that some action be taken to address the harms caused by 
racial marketing of ART products.  
I.  PACKAGING RACE IN THE ART MARKET 
The ART market provides a unique opportunity to study the 
dynamics of racial formation, as it involves two critical institu-
tions, the market and the family, that promote and reflect mes-
sages about race.62 Consumers and sellers reproduce race by cir-
culating certain formal institutional definitions of race and by 
producing their own individual interpretations of racial defini-
tions and rules.63 With this in mind we will examine the dynam-
ics of racial exchange in the ART market—the specific assur-
ances and practices that together establish a contract between 
buyer and seller for gametes of a particular “race.” With an un-
derstanding of the rules of racial exchange, we learn why ART 
consumers believe that race is an item “of value,” and we can 
evaluate the function of this kind of commercial exchange. More 
specifically we can determine whether we should recognize con-
tractual promises for the sale of race and whether we should al-
low suits for damages when racial commodities that were prom-
ised are not delivered. Importantly, as one grows more familiar 
with the rules of racial exchange in the American gamete mar-
ket, one is confronted with their questionable logic and rampant 
inconsistency, and one is forced to conclude that the current com-
mercial regime is administratively untenable and ripe for litiga-
tion.  
Race is clearly important to American ART consumers.64 
They tend to rank it first or second in importance when selecting 
 
 62. See generally Zalense, supra note 49. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Some consumers rank race as being the most important criteria. Fogg-
Davis, supra note 14, at 15. Most websites feature a drop-down menu that in-
vites purchasers to select by race. See, e.g., Find a Donor, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, 
https://fairfaxcryobank.com/search [https://perma.cc/QXB5-7YJC]; Find a Do-
nor, SEATTLE SPERM BANK, https://www.seattlespermbank.com/donors/# 
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a donor; occasionally, it is trumped by intelligence.65 Although 
American ART consumers rank race high on the list of desired 
characteristics, curiously they do not appear to do any due dili-
gence on the racial identity of their chosen donors or inquire 
about clinic categorization practices. Instead, they tend to accept 
clinic representations at face value, a practice that is profoundly 
naïve given the politics of racial identification in the United 
States.66 Consumer naivety about a clinic’s racial packaging 
practices is to be expected. Clinic practices related to the pack-
aging of race when initially described seem simple and transpar-
ent, and therefore do not invite scrutiny. However, once the veil 
is lifted, one discovers that this packaging regime is a powerful 
force that shapes race and consumers’ racial desire; the regime 
then justifies the standards it has created by citing thin argu-
ments about market demand and customer preferences.67  
A. PACKAGING GAMETES  
The process for selecting a sperm or egg donor is highly com-
petitive. At some banks, only one to two percent of persons that 
apply are ultimately accepted as donors.68 The process in the 
first stage is mechanical. A prospective donor fills out an intake 
form in which he or she is required to provide basic background 
 
[https://perma.cc/Q3FM-CA9C]; Find A Donor, XYTEX SPERM BANK, https:// 
www.xytex.com/search-donors [https://perma.cc/2R7U-BSW9].  
 65. Race is typically one of the introductory informational items requested 
on a donor form. Fogg-Davis, supra note 14, at 15. Other forms request that 
donors identify the “ethnicities” in their families. The sperm or egg bank then 
sorts them into racial categories as it defines those categories.  
 66. Research failed to reveal any sources providing consumers with an 
open, comparative discussion of the clinic’s varying racial categorization prac-
tices. Sources instead focus on clinics’ general intake practices as analyzed by 
sociologists and other scholars. See, e.g., Quiroga, supra note 30, at 149 (“ART 
practitioners are not consciously devoted to controlling women’s bodies or up-
holding whiteness. . . . [B]ut they are often oblivious to the subtle ways in which 
they perpetuate racial classificatory systems. . . . For example, as a service to 
potential consumers, semen banks will provide catalogs detailing donor charac-
teristics, presumably to facilitate matching of donor characteristics with that of 
the potential social father. Yet it is the bank’s personnel who decide what infor-
mation about the donor will be highlighted and ultimately who is an appropriate 
donor.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Selecting a Sperm Bank, CAL. CRYOBANK, https://cryobank 
.com/why-use-us/selecting-a-sperm-bank [https://perma.cc/QC46-E3KL] (ex-
plaining that California Cryobank only accepts one to two percent of potential 
applicants as donors).  
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health information as well as information about his or her race 
and ethnicity.69 The prospective donor’s health information is re-
viewed to screen out persons that are ineligible because of infec-
tious diseases or hereditary conditions.70 For example, at pre-
sent, HIV-positive persons cannot donate, nor can persons 
infected with hepatitis or other diseases potentially transmitted 
to a mother through the ART process.71 Similarly, persons with 
congenital defects and disabilities of various kinds, including 
mental illness, are ineligible as well.72 More controversially, per-
sons that allegedly engage in high-risk behaviors are screened 
out, including IV drug users and men “who have ever had sex 
with other men”73 or women that have sex with bisexual men.74 
Lastly, persons with so-called “undesirable” social backgrounds 
do not make the cut; applicants that cannot pass a criminal back-
ground check are subject to disqualification.75  
 
 69. See, e.g., Be a Sperm Donor – FAQ, SEATTLE SPERM BANK, https://www 
.seattlespermbank.com/be-a-sperm-donor-faq [https://perma.cc/UDD6-YED7]. 
 70. Id.; What Does It Take To Become a Sperm Donor?, PHX. SPERM BANK 
(Jan. 19, 2015), https://www.phoenixspermbank.com/blog/take-become-sperm 
-donor [https://perma.cc/C3HL-PHQ6]. For an anecdotal account of the process, 
see David Plotz, The Genius Factory: My Short, Scary Career as a Sperm Donor, 
SLATE (June 7, 2005, 8:47 AM), http://www.slate.com/human-interest/2005/06/ 
my-short-scary-career-as-a-sperm-donor.html [https://perma.cc/T988-5NYC]. 
 71. Cf. What Does It Take To Become a Sperm Donor?, supra note 70 (dis-
cussing the screening process). 
 72. See Plotz, supra note 70. These rules are derived from the FDA regula-
tions governing sperm banks. Cf. Be a Sperm Donor – FAQ, supra note 69 (ex-
plaining the FDA regulates donors). 
 73. See What Does It Take To Become a Sperm Donor?, supra note 70. The 
FDA has banned men who have had sex with other men in the last five years 
from anonymously donating sperm. See Taimour Tahir Chaudhri, Gay Men 
Cannot Anonymously Donate Sperm?: How the FDA’s Exclusion Unconstitution-
ally Restricts and Discriminates Against the LGBT Community, SETON HALL U. 
L. SCH. STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP (May 1, 2014), https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1419&context=student_scholarship [https://perma.cc/ 
N9WE-P2W9]. 
 74. See, e.g., Requirements for Donors, EGG DONATION CTR. OF DALLAS, 
http://www.eggdonorcenter.com/donor_requirements.html [https://perma.cc/ 
2EEE-B6NZ] (“You must not have had any sexual contact with homosexual or 
bisexual men at this time, or at any time in the past.”). 
 75. Reputable sperm banks routinely run criminal background checks on 
candidates, looking for all misdemeanors and felonies. See Screening Process for 
Sperm Donors, SEATTLE SPERM BANK, https://www.seattlespermbank.com/ 
screening-process-for-all-sperm-donors [https://perma.cc/K4JS-K96Y] (discuss-
ing criminal background checks); see also Donor Screening, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, 
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Screening does not merely take the form of excluding those 
persons in categories deemed socially undesirable. The second 
stage of donor selection is more impressionistic and discretion-
ary. Gamete banks take great care to recruit only those donors 
that have highly prized characteristics. As one bank puts it, 
banks want their buyers to know that their donor pool is made 
up of high quality people.76 Consequently, sperm and egg provid-
ers tend to search for persons with a superior physical appear-
ance, to ensure their donors have the ability to pass on physical 
traits deemed socially attractive.77 For example, banks refuse 
donations from men under five feet eight inches tall and most 
men or women that do not have a “healthy” BMI, meaning, for 
example, who seem “overweight” by Western standards.78 Donor 
catalogues also suggest that gamete agencies select donors with 
features that are in accord with traditional notions of femininity 
and masculinity.79 The swimsuits photos sometimes used make 
it clear that, beyond BMI, donors are selected if they have aes-
thetically pleasing bodies.80 Also, “glamour” shots or headshots 
 
https://fairfaxcryobank.com/donor-screening [https://perma.cc/L92V-YPST] 
(discussing the need to “pass” a criminal background check). 
 76. See Screening Process for Sperm Donors, supra note 75. “Research on 
how recipients select donors suggests that staff are responding to client interest 
in attractive and intelligent donors whose phenotypes are similar to their own.” 
Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and 
the Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 319, 326 (2007) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 77. See Almeling, supra note 76, at 326 (discussing Western Sperm Bank’s 
standard for donor selection: “When I’m interviewing somebody to be a donor, 
of course personality is really important. Are they gonna be responsible? But 
immediately I’m also clicking in my mind: Are they blond? Are they blue-eyed? 
Are they tall? Are they Jewish? So [I’m] not just looking at the [sperm] counts 
and the [health] history but also can we sell this donor?”).  
 78. See Cynthia R. Daniels & Janet Golden, Procreative Compounds: Pop-
ular Eugenics, Artificial Insemination and the Rise of the American Sperm 
Banking Industry, 38 J. SOC. HIST. 5, 17–20 (2004) (describing the range of char-
acteristics sought in sperm donors and effects on pricing); Become a Sperm Do-
nor, CAL. CRYOBANK, https://cryobank.com/services/become-a-sperm-donor/ 
[https://perma.cc/6CTA-Y4QD]. 
 79. Cf. Almeling, supra note 76, at 327 (explaining donors are “expected to 
embody middle-class American femininity or masculinity”); Daniels & Golden, 
supra note 78, at 5 (describing “catalogs which feature glossy photos of virile 
men”). 
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are common.81 Every effort is made to ensure that the consumer 
is choosing from a pool of aesthetically pleasing donors.82 Donor 
selection is so heavily tilted toward the attractive that many 
ART websites include a search feature that allows consumers to 
identify donors by choosing two or three celebrity look-a-likes for 
their donor.83 Savvy ART consumers know that there is no as-
surance that a child produced from an attractive donor’s gametes 
will have the same physical characteristics as the donor, as the 
mechanisms for genetically transmitting many traits are not 
well known.84 However, the probability that the donor’s charac-
teristics may be passed to the child are apparently sufficient to 
make these aesthetic characteristics an important part of the do-
nor selection process.85  
 
 81. See id. This process, however, is somewhat fraught as the norms of ideal 
femininity must be carefully negotiated. See Almeling, supra note 76, at 329. 
An employee at Creative Beginnings, an egg agency, makes reference to this 
issue when describing the ideal donor picture: “You don’t want something where 
your boobs are hanging out of your top [laughter]. These people are not looking 
for sexy people.” Id.  
 82. See Almeling, supra note 76, at 326–27. 
 83. See, e.g., Donor Look-A-Likes, CAL. CRYOBANK, https://www.cryobank 
.com/donor-search/look-a-likes [https://perma.cc/U8RX-LMDB]. One could ar-
gue that consumers are not duped by these marketing practices. Rather, they 
do not challenge these false marketing representations made by the ART indus-
try because these representations are in accord with common social practice, 
the industry is merely mimicking how we search for mating partners in the “real 
world.” Choosing an intelligent or beautiful sexual partner or life partner is of-
ten motivated by the expectation that one’s progeny will bear the same traits. 
Cf. Dan Neuharth, Why We Choose the Mates We Do – and How To Choose the 
Best Mate for You, PSYCH CENT., https://blogs.psychcentral.com/love-matters/ 
2018/08/why-we-choose-the-mates-we-do-and-how-to-choose-the-best-mate-for 
-you [https://perma.cc/DHC7-W3M8] (last updated Jul. 24, 2019) (“[M]ales tend 
to seek women who show signs of good fertility . . . [t]hus men instinctively look 
for women who display youth and physical attractiveness.”). The average lay 
person does not factor in that the chosen mate’s traits may not be carried over 
to the child, nor are they interested in the relative probability of this transfer 
occurring. Cf. Daniels & Golden, supra note 78, at 20 (“[C]onsumer demands, 
based on misguided beliefs about heritability, shaped the operations of sperm 
banks.”).  
 84. See Daniels & Golden, supra note 78, at 17–20; How To Choose a Sperm 
Donor, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, https://fairfaxcryobank.com/how-to-choose-a-sperm 
-donor [https://perma.cc/E9L8-PEST] (explaining that donor traits one selects 
for are not guaranteed to be passed to progeny). 
 85. Some of the sperm donor descriptions read more like descriptions of the 
lead in a romance novel. One can choose between the “active architect,” the 
“world traveler,” an “eager engineer,” or the man who is “going for a Grammy.” 
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Similarly, intelligence is highly valued.86 To address this 
concern, sperm and egg banks are well known for concentrating 
their recruitment efforts near college campuses.87 As a result, 
the sample collected tends to be more educated than the general 
United States public. Of course, college attendance does not nec-
essarily guarantee intelligence.88 Rather, prior educational at-
tainment merely reflects access, social privilege, and interest in 
securing a higher degree.89 Additionally, there is no gene cur-
rently known to transmit measured intelligence in a sure fash-
ion.90 This fact seems of little concern to gamete banks as they 
continue to produce materials highlighting donors’ SAT scores 
and academic accomplishments.91 Intelligence and beauty as-
sessments are merely examples of a larger problem. Gamete 
banks list a wide range of highly desirable characteristics their 
donors happen to have, even though they know these traits, 
qualities, or talents will not necessarily be genetically transmit-
ted to the donor’s progeny.92 Musical ability, an interest in writ-
ing poetry, a desire to work in humanitarian fields: all of these 
features are likely to be included in a donor’s profile.93 He or she 
may be asked to fill out a questionnaire describing his or her fa-
vorite animal, color, or musical group.94 Donors may also be 
asked to consent to recorded interviews so that ART consumers 
 
Donor Search, CAL. CRYOBANK, https://cryobank.com/search/ [https://perma 
.cc/8LKE-2XCW].  
 86. See Daniels & Golden, supra note 78, at 19. 
 87. See id. (noting most “donors come from UCLA, USC, Stanford, Harvard 
and MIT”). Daniels and Golden also found two sperm banks selling something 
called “Doctorate Donors” with higher prices. Id. They also discussed Heredity 
Choice, a sperm bank that specializes in intelligent donors. Id. 
 88. See Almeling, supra note 76, at 326. 
 89. Cf. id. (discussing how childless women have more time to pursue aca-
demia). 
 90. See Emily Willingham, No, Research Has Not Established that You In-




 91. See Daniels & Golden, supra note 78, at 18. 
 92. Donors may also be asked about their SAT scores or GRE scores, musi-
cal ability, religious affiliation, and other items. Id. at 19. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. Other information requested may include pet preferences and 
handwriting samples. Id. 
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can determine whether they think the donor “has a nice person-
ality.”95 Administrators at gamete banks freely admit that, alt-
hough they know that the traits listed in a donor’s profile may 
not be genetically transmitted, detailed profiles tend to make 
consumers feel close to particular donors, and consumers are 
more likely to choose a donor with whom they feel an emotional 
connection.96 The most disturbing aspect of this phenomenon is, 
even though gamete providers know they cannot predict whether 
a donor’s traits and skills will be genetically transmitted to her 
child, pricing in some cases is still determined by how many of 
these favorable characteristics a donor has, including preferred 
racial characteristics.97 Indeed, the initial process of being se-
lected hinges on these broader attractiveness considerations.98  
B. PACKAGING RACE  
The initial screening to determine the “race” of gamete do-
nors seems simple: donors answer a questionnaire asking them 
to self-identify by ethnicity and/or race.99 In reality, however, the 
 
 95. See Almeling, supra note 76, at 326–27 (“Some screening standards are 
based on biomedical guidelines for genetic material most likely to result in preg-
nancy, but many reflect client requests for socially desirable characteris-
tics. . . . [T]he staff are responding to recipients who ‘want to know that the per-
son donating is a good person.’”); Plotz, supra note 70 (explaining he would be 
required to supply an audio CD about himself to proceed with the donation pro-
cess). 
 96. See Almeling, supra note 76, at 329 (“The profile really gives recipients 
a chance to get to know you on another level, even though it’s anonymous. It 
feels like it’s personal. It feels like they’re making a connection with you.”); Dan-
iels & Golden, supra note 78, at 17–19 (“Such traits [height, weight, hair color, 
eye color, skin tone, hair texture] are presumed to be heritable, that is, trans-
mitted through genes, although there is no guarantee that a blue-eyed, blonde-
haired donor, even when coupled with a blue-eyed, blonde-haired mother, will 
produce a blue-eyed, blonde-haired baby. . . . [Sperm banks providing infor-
mation about social traits, such as education, standardized test scores, and re-
ligion] drive the marketing and advertising of sperm and that marketing, in 
turn, feeds fantasies about offspring and about the power of modern science to 
satisfy consumer demands.”). 
 97. See Almeling, supra note 76, at 336. Egg pricing is more susceptible to 
these pricing fluctuations based on traits. In the sperm market one sees them 
most prominently in stocking decisions. These issues are discussed in more de-
tail in the sections that follow. 
 98. See Plotz, supra note 70 (describing searching questions and intake 
workers’ use of these considerations to determine his eligibility to be a donor). 
 99. See Laura Harrison, The Woman or the Egg? Race in Egg Donation and 
Surrogacy Databases, GENDERS (2013), https://www.academia.edu/8452491/ 
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procedures for packaging race are far more complicated; they 
fundamentally structure the ART market, involve multiple dis-
cretionary decisions, and—perhaps unwittingly—send im-
portant messages to ART consumers. Also, the consequences of 
this screening process have huge financial implications. In the 
ART market, race is big business.100 While the pricing structure 
for sperm tends to be relatively flat, sales of eggs show that race 
plays a key role in pricing.101 A blond, highly educated egg donor 
can fetch as much as $100,000 for her eggs.102 More recently eggs 
from Asian donors, particularly “pure-blood Chinese eggs” have 
 
The_Woman_or_the_Egg_Race_in_Egg_Donation_and_Surrogacy_Databases 
[https://perma.cc/Y4CJ-MTMK?type=image] (“The mainstream scientific con-
sensus is that race is not a biological phenomenon but rather a complex histor-
ical, social, political, and scientific construct. In sharp contrast, companies that 
profit from the sale of sperm or eggs seamlessly transfer the self-identification 
of the donor to the disembodied gamete.”). 
 100. See Sharyn Alfonsi, Inside Egg Donation: More Money for Blondes?, 
ABC NEWS (May 11, 2010, 10:15 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/WN/egg 
-donation-agencies-paid-money-favored-attributes/story?id=10614326 [https:// 
perma.cc/2AB6-JTT6]. 
 101. See Almeling, supra note 76, at 336 (describing race’s effect on pricing). 
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine, an advisory organization that 
monitors the ART industry, strongly discourages pricing eggs and sperm based 
on donor characteristics. Clara Moskowitz, Exorbitant Fees Offered to Human 
Egg Donors, Study Finds, LIVE SCI. (Mar. 26, 2010), https://www.livescience 
.com/8171-exorbitant-fees-offered-human-egg-donors-study-finds.html [https:// 
perma.cc/6FRY-RJBJ?type=image]. However, this guideline is violated regu-
larly. See Clara Moskowitz, Egg Donors Offered up to $50,000: Fees Far Exceed 
Ethics Guidelines, Study Finds, NBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2010, 9:26 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/36057566/ns/health-womens_health/t/egg-donors 
-offered/#.XjN7fC2ZNQJ [https://perma.cc/T5LR-BCJ3] (indicating that more 
than a quarter of 100 ads studied offered more than $10,000 for eggs and some 
offered as much as $50,000). 
 102. Egg Donation in America, MARIE CLAIRE (Oct. 27, 2014, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.marieclaire.co.uk/reports/egg-donation-in-america-200226 [https:// 
perma.cc/TH5U-XKVQ] (“While the average payment per donor cycle is $4,217 
(£2,795), it’s not uncommon for a donor to be paid $15,000 (£9,940), and in spe-
cial cases (typically, a blonde, blue-eyed, athletic Ivy League student) fees have 
hit the $100,000 mark.”); see also Alfonsi, supra note 100 (describing study 
showing rising prices and higher price for blondes, with some women earning 
$50,000 per engagement); Marilee Enge, Ad Seeks Donor Eggs for $100,000, 
Possible New High, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 10, 2000), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/ct-xpm-2000-02-10-0002100320-story.html [https://perma.cc/B3UJ-4CPL] 
(describing donor-advertisement that specified the egg “donor must be under 
30, Caucasian and an athlete”).  
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commanded a high price.103 Importantly, because there are no 
federal or state regulations for gamete banks regarding market-
ing or pricing, racial pricing occurs regularly.104  
The clearest role race plays is in sperm banks’ stocking de-
cisions. Most banks have a set stock of sperm in storage; they 
take multiple steps to ensure that high-demand racial products 
are available. While only seventy-one percent of Americans ra-
cially identify as white, overall eighty percent of sperm and eggs 
available in the United States are drawn from “Caucasian” do-
nors.105 Additionally, American consumers can easily import 
“white” sperm or eggs if they are unhappy with the current do-
mestic stock available, or they can choose to have cheaper ART 
services conducted abroad.106 Denmark is the largest exporter of 
sperm in the world; some believe its success is due to the fact 
that the country has a large native population of white, blonde, 
and blue-eyed donors.107 Also, the ART market makes fertility 
 
 103. See, e.g., Shan Li, Asian Women Command Premium Prices for Egg Do-
nation in U.S., L.A. TIMES (May 4, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/ 
health/la-xpm-2012-may-04-la-fi-egg-donation-20120504-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/V6V4-8AT8] (discussing clinic’s decision to compensate Asian women 
donors $10,000 to $20,000 instead of the $6,000 normally paid for eggs because 
it was difficult to find Asian ova). The highest prices were paid for eggs from 
100% pure Chinese women with degrees in math. Id.; see also Erin Ryan, Want 
To Sell Your Eggs To Pay for College? Be Asian, JEZEBEL (May 4, 2012) https:// 
jezebel.com/want-to-sell-your-eggs-to-pay-for-college-be-asian-5907657/ 
[https://perma.cc/SP22-UWFM]. Some advertisements promise “Asian” eggs 
will fetch a price of $100,000 to attract donors. Li, supra.  
 104. See Li, supra note 103. 
 105. Daniels & Golden, supra note 78, at 18. 
 106. Cf. Sirin Kale, Women Are Now Pillaging Sperm Banks for Viking Ba-
bies, VICE (Oct. 1, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
3dx9nj/women-are-now-pillaging-sperm-banks-for-viking-babies [https://perma 
.cc/SJA8-6V38] (discussing the exportation of Danish sperm). See generally 
SPEIER, supra note 27 (discussing ART tourism to Eastern Europe). 
 107. Sarfraz Manzoor, Come Inside: The World’s Biggest Sperm Bank, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 2, 2012, 7:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/ 
nov/02/worlds-biggest-sperm-bank-denmark [https://perma.cc/8DMC-6TM5] 
(“Cryos . . . is today the world’s largest sperm bank. Schou estimates that Cryos 
has been responsible for more than 30,000 births, producing more than 2,000 
babies a year, and - in what has been called a new Viking invasion - the company 
exports sperm to more than 70 countries. Cryos and similar companies, such as 
the European Sperm Bank, have helped turn Denmark into the sperm capital 
of the world.”); see also About Us, CRYOS DENMARK, https://dk 
.cryosinternational.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/896L-Y93T] (listing itself as 
“The World’s Largest Sperm Bank”). But see Soo Youn, America v Denmark: The 
Battle for Dominance in the Growing, Global Sperm Market, IRISH TIMES (Aug. 
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tourism available to white-American working-class consumers 
priced out of domestic ART services; these consumers flock to the 
Czech Republic because the ART industry in that country offers 
an easy supply of low-cost anonymously donated eggs from 
white, blond donors.108  
Again, “standard” white sperm in the ART market some-
times costs less than sperm of other races because the ART mar-
ket ensures that white sperm is plentiful and therefore always 
has a large supply.109 Minority consumers, by contrast, will often 
find that their chosen sperm bank does not charge more for their 
race; it just has extremely few samples available for their racial 
group. Similar dynamics predominate in the search for egg do-
nors.110 For example, typically one can only find two to three 
Black egg or sperm donors on a gamete agency website; some 
have no Black donors at all.111 Clinics justify these racially tilted 
stocking decisions based on customer demand: white consumers 
are their primary customers, and they assume these consumers 
 
16, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/health-family/parenting/ 
america-v-denmark-the-battle-for-dominance-in-the-growing-global-sperm 
-market-1.3598113 [https://perma.cc/U3AP-58X7?type=image] (“Sperm from 
the US and Denmark dominate the market because those countries currently 
have the most supply, experts say. It’s unclear whether their rivalry is serious 
or in jest, but US-based California Cryobank and Denmark’s Cryos Interna-
tional each insist that their sperm repository is biggest.”). 
 108. See generally SPEIER, supra note 27.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New 
and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2003) (con-
ducting a review of one sperm bank and finding only four percent of stores were 
labeled “Black”); Arlett R. Hartie, Where’s the Black Sperm???, YOUTUBE (Apr. 
9, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSCUX6srY_w (discussing diffi-
culties replicating her phenotype because the sperm bank she used only had a 
small number of Black samples); Arlett R. Hartie, Where’s the Black Sperm! The 
Joy of Picking a Sperm Donor, CHASING JOY BLOG (Apr. 10, 2015), http:// 
chasing-joy.com/choosing-black-sperm-donor [https://perma.cc/KN98-2THF] 
(discussing difficulties of finding Black sperm donors); Sohmakun, Has Anyone 
Ever Used a Donor of a Different Race? MOTHERING (Jan. 18, 2019, 8:38 PM), 
http://www.mothering.com/forum/438-multicultural-families/1032432-has 
-anyone-ever-used-donor-different-race.html [https://perma.cc/93XX-H7P7] (de-
scribing difficulties because sperm bank used only had one to two Black sam-
ples); Brittany Thornburley, Aspiring Queer Mom Seeks Black Sperm Donor, 
Can’t Find Too Many, AUTOSTRADDLE (Apr. 20. 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www 
.autostraddle.com/aspiring-queer-mom-seeks-black-sperm-donor-cant-find-too 
-many-375953 [https://perma.cc/AG8V-D39H] (noting difficulties of “getting 
some damn black sperm”).  
 
  
2020] CONTRACTING OUR WAY TO INEQUALITY 2401 
 
want white gametes.112 Yet this stocking decision assumes racial 
rejection as a constant—white consumers are never challenged 
to look beyond their group because white gametes dominate the 
sample pool.  
The reason the customer base is white points to other in-
equality concerns. Specifically, the price charged for ART ser-
vices is so high that poor couples, many of whom are minori-
ties, simply cannot afford to use them.113 The social messages 
projected by gamete banks’ stocking decisions establish that 
the industry is primarily designed for white consumers.114 In-
deed, this evidence is sufficient to debunk the claim that the ART 
market provides equal access for all races.115  
Of course, gamete-agency providers likely know they are not 
actually selling race; rather, they are selling gametes from do-
nors with certain racially associated phenotypes.116 More pre-
cisely, gamete agencies are offering ART consumers a donor pool 
that has a good probability of transmitting certain racialized 
characteristics to their progeny.117 However, because the gamete 
 
 112. See, e.g., Rachel Rabbit White, Only White, Straight, Attractive Women 





Similar rules also apply to sperm donors. See Ertman, supra note 111, at 15–30 
(illustrating how customer demand explained sperm bank’s decision to main-
tain a sperm catalogue that was nearly seventy percent white). 
 113. See Nanette R. Elster, ART for the Masses? Racial and Ethnic Inequal-
ity in Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 719, 
721–22 (2005); Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 935, 939 (1996).  
 114. See Roberts, supra note 113, at 937.  
 115. See Elster, supra note 113, at 722 (noting a study addressing disparities 
in access to infertility services). 
 116. Gamete agency-providers are not selling race, per se, but rather pheno-
typic traits that are typically associated with race. See Almeling, supra note 76, 
at 332 (discussing one study that demonstrated how sperm-bank staff are “re-
sponding to client interest in . . . donors whose phenotypes are similar to their 
own”); see also John H. Relethford, Race and Global Patterns of Phenotypic Var-
iation, 139 AM. J. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 16, 16 (2009) (noting how “most 
classic definitions of race focus on phenotypic traits such as skin color, cranio-
facial shape, and hair color and texture” and how such traits are used for “clas-
sification in every day contexts”). 
 117. See Roberts, supra note 113 at 945 (noting how infertile couples choose 
gametes based on a desire to share genetic traits). 
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providers are merely selling donors with racially associated phe-
notypes, gamete banks are required to make a number of discre-
tionary decisions about how race is defined. The more “racially 
pure” a white donor is, the less likelihood there is that the donor 
will have recessive genes associated with minority-phenotypes 
that will unexpectedly emerge.118 Therefore, clinics must make 
determinations about what kind of racial admixture will still 
count as “white” and how much racial admixture they will toler-
ate when accepting a person into the category of whiteness.119 At 
present, gamete providers’ donor catalogues suggest that gamete 
banks are enforcing variations of the infamous “one drop” rule 
with regard to Black gametes.120 Stated simply, one Black grand-
parent is sufficient to take a donor-candidate out of the category 
of whiteness, in stark contrast to the way racial admixture is 
treated concerning other groups.  
Indeed, review of sperm donor catalogues reveals that in-
take workers at ART clinics are exercising a fair degree of incon-
sistent and unrestrained discretion in screening out what they 
perceive to be non-white donors. Most gamete providers’ donor 
web-catalogues include persons with a range of European or tra-
ditionally white ethnicities in the category of whiteness, specifi-
cally French, English, Russian and Danish.121 Consistent with 
contemporary “honorary whiteness” norms, “whites” with a 
small amount of Latin American or Asian ancestry are desig-
nated white at some clinics, but standards of racial purity are 
far stricter at others.122 Gamete providers’ catalogues also more 
 
 118. Fogg-Davis, supra note 14, at 19. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 13 n.15 (citing J.F. DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? ONE NATION’S DEFINI-
TIONS (1991)). 
 121. Sperm Donor Search, SEATTLE SPERM BANK, https://www 
.seattlespermbank.com/donors [https://perma.cc/2U6S-39UL]. 
 122. Honorary whiteness norms are norms that allow for certain groups to 
be afforded similar privileged social treatment as whites—even though they are 
recognized as actually being members of a minority group or mixed race. See 
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, From Bi-Racial to Tri-Racial: Towards a New System of 
Racial Stratification in the USA, 27 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 931, 931 (2004) 
(coining the term “Honorary Whites”). Mixed race persons who visually appear 
to phenotypically fall within the category of whiteness are sometimes given 
privileged social status over other members of their group. Id.; see also Donor 
Catalog, MANHATTAN CRYOBANK, http://www.manhattancryobank.com/donors 
[http://web.archive.org/web/20180215225553/http://www.manhattancryobank 
.com/donors] (listing over forty donors as Caucasian all with pure European an-
cestry); Donor Search, supra note 85 (listing whites as including a broad range 
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recently have featured certain Asian purity standards, given the 
high price these “racially pure” Asian gametes may fetch.123 In 
other ostensibly lower status groups, such as Blacks and Latinx 
persons, racial admixture of various kinds is more easily “toler-
ated.”124 Also, most gamete-provider donor-catalogues feature a 
“Mixed” or “Other” category, typically used by mixed race cou-
ples attempting to create a child that reflects their racial un-
ion.125 These mixed categories are vastly smaller than the white 
samples,126 and they function well to demarcate the genetic dis-
tinctiveness and purity of the samples the sperm and egg banks 
are offering as “white” sperm and egg donors. 
The tolerance of mixed race “blood” in low-status racial cat-
egories also has consequences for the minority consumer. One 
study, conducted by reviewing more than 1000 sperm bank pro-
files, or roughly forty-nine percent of sperm stores available at 
that time, concluded that donors are selected based on how 
closely they can match with a Euro-American ideal.127 Even 
within minority categories, light-skinned donors and donors 
with less “nappy” hair are preferred.128 In short, some clinics ap-
peared to be actively constructing representations of Black per-
sons that trend towards the aesthetics associated with white 
standards of beauty.129 Other minority consumers have reported 
the opposite problem: that the racial gametes in stock at a given 
 
of Asian, Latino and Middle Eastern relatives as Caucasian persons); Sperm 
Donor Search, supra note 121 (listing only 7 of 164 donors as having any African 
American Race/Ethnicity). 
 123. Li, supra note 103. 
 124. Quiroga, supra note 30, at 155 (discussing the case in which one Black 
woman was willing to settle for sperm that was racially tangential, with “Afri-
can descent over history and time,” when told that Black donors weren’t avail-
able). 
 125. See, e.g., Find a Donor, supra note 64 (offering six check boxes for an-
cestry in a sperm donor search, including “Any,” “Caucasian,” “Asian,” “Latino,” 
“Black,” or “Multi”). 
 126. See, e.g., id. (noting, as of February 23, 2020, a total of 473 sperm do-
nors, including 299 Caucasian donors, and only 43 “Multi”-racial donors); Sperm 
Donor Search, supra note 121 (noting, as of February 23, 2020, a total of 164 
sperm donors, including 112 Caucasian donors, and only 21 “Mix”-racial do-
nors). 
 127. Daniels & Golden, supra note 78, at 20. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Almeling, supra note 76, at 332. One ART worker in the egg donor sec-
tor explained of a donor: “She’s Caucasian enough, she’s white enough to pass, 
but she has a nice good hue to her if you have a Hispanic couple.” Id. 
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clinic have phenotypic characteristics that represent a more ste-
reotypical view of Blackness and do not match their actual fea-
tures.130 Given the extraordinarily small number of Black sam-
ples various sperm banks provide, consumers have argued that 
ART providers are simply not interested in representing the true 
phenotype diversity in Black communities in the United 
States.131  
Gamete providers also believe there is great consumer anx-
iety about accidental race-mixing and they have used many pro-
cedures to ensure these racial mistakes do not occur.132 Dorothy 
Roberts and other scholars confirm this widespread anxiety ex-
ists; indeed, it is reflected by the numerous news stories and ur-
ban legends documenting racial mistake and accidental mixing 
“problems.”133 To minimize the risk of mistake, many gamete 
banks attach color-coded labels to the sperm vials and eggs sam-
ples they have in storage.134 There is no subtly in this labeling 
regime. Black sperm is given a black label.135 Asian sperm is 
 
 130. Quiroga, supra note 30, at 157 (highlighting a trend of “interchangea-
bility” between “any black donors” and a Black individual looking for sperm, 
and how ART providers “are not concerned with matching [the Black con-
sumer’s] physical characteristics” with the available sperm). 
 131. Id. at 156 (noting the case of one woman whose fertility doctor’s attitude 
that “any black male available” is a satisfactory donor regardless of physical 
attributes “calls up the prejudiced phrases ‘can’t tell them apart’ or ‘they all look 
alike’”). 
 132. Almeling, supra note 76, at 327 (“In Creative Beginnings’ office, there 
is a cabinet for ‘active donor’ files. The top two drawers are labeled ‘Caucasian,’ 
and the bottom drawer is labeled ‘Black, Asian, Hispanic.’ During a tour of Cryo- 
Corp, the founder lifted sperm samples out of the storage tank filled with liquid 
nitrogen, explaining that the vials are capped with white tops for Caucasian 
donors, black tops for African American donors, yellow tops for Asian donors, 
and red tops for donors with ‘mixed ancestry.’”).  
 133. Patricia Williams and Dorothy Roberts argue that the dominant place-
ment ART racial mix-up cases secure in American media demonstrates whites’ 
profound anxiety about racial mistakes in ART. See ROBERTS, supra note 23, at 
271 (“But receiving the wrong white child would have been a far less devasting 
experience. In the American market, a Black baby is indisputably an inferior 
product.”); WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 240–41 (discussing the media hysteria 
surrounding a case in which a Black woman gave birth to a white child after 
having been implanted with a white woman’s egg). For a contemporary exam-
ple, see David Mikkelson, Black Donor’s Sperm Mistakenly Sent to Neo-Nazi 
Couple?, SNOPES (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.snopes.com/fact-check/the-color-of 
-sperm/ [https://perma.cc/N637-J8UB] (debunking widely circulated news story 
alleging racial mix-up in ART).  
 134. See, e.g., Daniels & Golden, supra note 78, at 20. 
 135. See id. at 5.  
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given a yellow label.136 White sperm receives a white label.137 
Red is sometimes used for mixed populations or Latinx individ-
uals.138 This process is profoundly disturbing as it makes race 
real in a particularly concrete way.139 By applying these labels 
to the sperm or egg samples, gamete banks create a racial pre-
destiny for the progeny produced from these genetic materials as 
they use specific, choreographed marketing approaches to deter-
mine who should be offered gametes of a particular race and how 
the resulting children should be understood by their parents.  
C. PACKAGING AND ITS EFFECT ON CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS 
Gamete banks indicate that the racial categorization stand-
ards they use are merely a response to pre-existing customer 
preferences.140 However, this representation cannot be taken at 
face value. Instead, various aspects of the process actively train 
donors to perceive the selection process as a way of either iden-
tically replicating their own genetic stock or taking steps to im-
prove the genetics of their family line.141 For example, most 
sperm banks feature a questionnaire or drop-down menu that 
asks customers to record their race and the race of their desired 
donor.142 Structures of this nature that privilege racial choices 
effectively nudge customers to adopt a perspective that gives 
race special value.143 Multiple aspects of the selection process 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 5–8. 
 140. Id. at 18 (noting sperm banks reflect “consumer demand”).  
 141. Id. at 13 (noting how scholars described germinal choice as an oppor-
tunity “to improve upon genetic constitution of their offspring” (internal cita-
tions omitted)). 
 142. See, e.g., Find a Donor, supra note 64. 
 143. The term nudge as used here is slightly different from the one offered 
in other discussions, although draws on these sources for insight. By nudge, I 
am referring to a background structural mechanism that shapes spaces or mo-
ments of “free” choice in ways that take account of individuals typical cognitive 
biases, normal routines, habits and rational cost-avoidance behavior. Well-de-
signed nudges give people opportunities to prefer societal beneficial choices as 
more consistent with their own perceived or self-declared interests. These 
nudges may operate by making hidden salient social costs more visible or fram-
ing the to appear more salient to decision-makers, delaying information reveals 
to minimize this information’s role in decision-making or structuring regimes 
in ways that increase burdens associated with the use of certain kind’s infor-
mation. For a general discussion of nudges, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
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trigger consumers to develop certain views about race and racial 
hierarchy in the United States. While other scholars have docu-
mented how the ART gamete search process shapes customer 
views of femininity and masculinity,144 this Article catalogues 
the significant ways gamete sellers’ marketing practices shape 
racial understandings. With a full view of the ways the process 
subtly and not so subtly shapes views about race, one under-
stands the challenges ART marketing norms create for the pro-
ject of racial equality.  
1. The Re-Biologization of Race  
One of the biggest threats the ART market poses to the pro-
ject of racial equality is that gamete banks are counseling con-
sumers that race is genetically carried and inheritable.145 How-
ever, most geneticists agree that race has no clear biological 
basis that can be established at the level of genetic code.146 Gam-
ete sellers know that race cannot be traced to particular genes.147 
 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAP-
PINESS (2008) (exploring concept as defined in behavioral economics). 
 144. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 1, at 597–601, and accompanying text. 
 145. See Patricia J. Williams, The Elusive Variability of Race, in RACE AND 
THE GENETIC REVOLUTION: SCIENCE, MYTH, AND CULTURE 241 (Sheldon Krim-
sky & Kathleen Sloan eds., 2011). 
 146. See generally Jennifer A. Hamilton, Revitalizing Difference in the Hap-
Map: Race and Contemporary Human Genetic Variation Research, 36 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 471 (2008). Unfortunately, theories of genetic race are again on the 
rise in some quarters. Id. The mapping of the human genome, which established 
that human beings shared 99.9% of the same genetic code, appeared to put ge-
netic theories of race to rest in 2000. Id. at 471. However, in the years since, 
some scientists have attempted to mine the 0.1% difference to discover a basis 
for claims of genetic race. Id. Attempts to track genes to particular geograph-
ically trapped populations are now used by some scientists to argue that genetic 
race exists. Id. at 472–73. However, even these population mapping definitions 
fail to neatly map onto the social definitions of race, which vary by country and 
shift over time. Id. at 474. Additionally, the genetic differences associated with 
particular geographically distinct populations also occur in other groups, mak-
ing even narrow genetic claims about race rest on questionable foundation. Id. 
For further discussion, see also Lynn B. Jorde & Stephen P. Wooding, Genetic 
Variation, Classification and “Race,” 36 NATURE GENETICS SUPPLEMENT S28, 
S28 (2004) (“[B]iomedical scientists are divided in their opinions about race. 
Some characterize it as ‘biologically meaningless’ or ‘not based on scientific ev-
idence,’ whereas others advocate the use of race in making decisions about med-
ical treatment or the design of research studies.”). 
 147. DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND 
BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4–5 (2012) (ex-
plaining that race is political and not biological, and that races cannot be sorted 
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Rather, it is an unstable collection of phenotype-features that 
are recognized in certain social contexts as placing an individual 
in a particular racial group. The definition of race, the physical 
characteristics recognized as composing race, vary over time and 
in response to political conditions.148 ART consumers are invited 
to abandon this understanding, and instead reinvest in a logic of 
blood lines and racial purity. This racial purity logic underpins 
white supremacy and has been used for generations to devalue 
and villainize minority communities.149 The greater irony is, the 
consumers most likely to use ART—educated and wealthy con-
sumers—have been subject to diversity and equality messaging 
for years that encourages cross-racial contact and often chal-
lenges the concept of biological race.150 Therefore, the ART in-
dustry is either actively re-inculcating people who had overcome 
biological concepts of race or, even worse, revealing that none of 
the instruction these Americans received debunking the notion 
of biological race had any impact at all. One thing is clear: the 
ART process is socializing a community with significant capital 
and social influence to believe in biological race. The instantia-
tion of race with this particular group—the active encourage-
ment to get them to reinvest in the logic of racial purity, racial 
distinctiveness, and the naturalness of segregation—poses sig-
nificant dangers. Reassuring this group of consumers that it can 
pass its wealth and power through new pure white racial blood-
lines represents one of the most startling aspects of the ART pro-
cess. Never has the property interest in whiteness been 
clearer.151 
2. Re-Instantiating Racial Categories  
The ART market has a second significant impact on discus-
sions of race: it is actively creating racial definitions, but it does 
 
into “zoological” categories because they are politically constructed).  
 148. Id.  
 149. See ROBERTS, supra note 23, at 261, 267–68 (discussing the concept of 
“racial impurity” and its use as a tool against minority groups). 
 150. See Almeling, supra note 76, at 337 (describing how the “reinscription” 
of race at the genetic level is “worrisome”); Quiroga, supra note 30, at 148 (ex-
plaining that the use of biomedical technology “reproduces cultural ideologies, 
power relations, and structural inequities”); Williams, supra note 145, at 241 
(recognizing the widespread cultural understanding that race is not genetic but 
the ambivalence many feel about accepting this proposition).  
 151. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1707 (1993) (examining how whiteness has developed into a form of property).  
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so in an ad hoc, seemingly apolitical fashion that is designed to 
maximize profit but also cultivates racial resentment and confu-
sion.152 Specifically, because there is no guidance in this area, 
definitions of race vary from clinic to clinic. Some gamete provid-
ers regard Arab and Middle Eastern donors as white; other ART 
providers treat members of these groups as being in a separate 
racial category.153 Some gamete providers regard Jewish donors 
as white, while other gamete providers treat Jewish persons, a 
religious category, as a separate racial category.154 Some provid-
ers appear to have made up racial and ethnic categories that 
don’t exist anywhere else, such as Aztec or Mayan.155 To be clear, 
there are no consistent standards for racial and ethnic defini-
tions in the ART industry. Manhattan Cryobank provides seven 
different racial/ethnic classifications for its sperm: African 
American or Black, Asian, Caucasian, Hispanic or Latino, Indian 
(Asian), Multi-ethnic, and Other.156 Under the “Other” category, 
the sperm bank provides a sole donor of Egyptian descent.157 In 
contrast, the California Cryobank provides eight different clas-
sifications: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or 
African American, Caucasian, East Indian, Hispanic or Latino, 
 
 152. Fogg-Davis, supra note 14, at 15. 
 153. See, e.g., Donor Profile – 5377, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, https:// 
fairfaxcryobank.com/search/donorprofile.aspx?number=5377&s=1 [https:// 
perma.cc/BMR3-RCSS] (categorizing donor as Latino despite listing his mater-
nal ethnic background as Brazilian-Spanish and his paternal ethnic background 
as Portuguese-Syrian). Native Americans are treated similarly and are some-
times absorbed into the category of whiteness. See, e.g., Short Profile Donor 
Number: B1025, CRYOGAM COLO., http://media.wix.com/ugd/3cdfcb_ 
a7f7fbf9b31b40dcb9061fa3ba560816.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T7E-8NYE] (listing 
Donor B1025’s ethnicity as “Irish, Native American” but race as “Caucasian” 
and noting brown hair color and medium skin tone).  
 154. Daniels & Golden, supra note 78, at 18 (noting how religions such as 
Judaism are sometimes conflated with race).  
 155. See, e.g., Donor Catalog Search, PACIFIC REPROD. SERVICES, https:// 
www.pacrepro.com/index.php?main_page=donor_search [https://perma.cc/8T28 
-PWKW] (allowing donors to search for donors of Mayan or Aztec ancestry). 
These categories likely correspond to Mexican and Central American ancestry 
but allow the bank to use higher status sounding ethnicities for their donors. 
 156. See Donor Catalog, MANHATTAN CRYOBANK, http://www 
.manhattancryobank.com/donors [http://web.archive.org/web/20180215225553/ 
http://www.manhattancryobank.com/donors/]. 
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Middle Eastern or Arabic, and Mixed or Multi-Ethnic.158 The 
Sperm Bank of California lists ninety-four different ethnic/racial 
categories, leaving it open as to how it will decide to sort these 
ethnicities into racial groupings.159 Gamete banks have extraor-
dinary power to shape consumers’ understandings of race as con-
sumers sort through these materials.160 A white donor that 
meets the definition of whiteness at one sperm bank may very 
well not meet that definition at another. For groups that are 
“marginal whites,” the understanding that certain administra-
tive groupings arbitrarily cast them outside the circle of white 
racial purity can be startling.161 
3. Racial Purity Rules  
Many clinics are tacitly enforcing eugenicist notions of racial 
purity to sort through mixed-race donors, in particular employ-
ing the “one drop” rule to disfavor donors with some African 
American or Black ancestry.162 Again, because they know race 
cannot be genetically transmitted, gamete banks know they are 
merely selling the consumer a donor that displays a certain ra-
cially associated phenotype, a donor that has a significant prob-
ability of passing some of these phenotype characteristics to 
their progeny. However, the process of genetic inheritance, even 
with regard to physical characteristics, is inexact and unsure. 
 
 158. See Donor Search, supra note 85. 
 159. Donor Catalog, SPERM BANK OF CAL., https://www 
.thespermbankofca.org/donor-catalog [https://perma.cc/G8F2-BDBB].  
 160. This approach is not followed by all sperm banks or egg donor websites, 
but it is particularly true of ones claiming a highly selective process. See, e.g., 
Donor Catalog, supra note 156. 
 161. See Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497, 
1517–23 (2010) (explaining that many ethnic whites sit at an intersectional va-
lence that marks them as low status whites and causes them to experience white 
privilege in inconsistent and partial fashion). Here this low status whiteness 
may cause them to be grouped as ethnic or minority, and may even trigger 
sperm bank operators to question whether they should be seeking “white” gam-
etes at all. Alternatively a donor may be rejected because he does not offer the 
kind of whiteness as the sperm bank defines this term. 
 162. See, e.g., Donor 5604, SPERM BANK OF CAL., https://www 
.thespermbankofca.org/donor-5604 [https://perma.cc/5GCT-TVY4] (listing Do-
nor 5604’s ancestry as “African/Black Descent” on the search results page, then 
listing Donor 5604’s Ancestry as “African/Black Descent” and “European/White 
Descent” and his ethnicity as “African American, English, Irish, and Creole” on 
his donor profile, demonstrating that despite the donor having both Afri-
can/Black and white ancestry, his African/Black ancestry caused him to be la-
beled as “African/Black” instead of white). 
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Consumers are purchasing the probability their children will 
have certain characteristics, but nothing is guaranteed. This re-
sults in many mixed race people being cast outside the circle of 
whiteness. Administrators of gamete banks know that people 
with a so-called mixed racial background will have tremendous 
genetic variation between each individual sperm and egg cell 
created, and great opportunity for phenotype variance from the 
donor herself. Specifically, each harvest of gametes from the 
mixed-race donor will contain eggs or sperm with different ge-
netic-ethnically associated codes; some of these genetic mixes 
may cause these gametes to be labeled as a different race or pro-
duce a child with a phenotype that places her in a different racial 
category than the donor.163 Clinics may assume this variation 
occurs with less frequency when the potential donor’s “mixed” 
history is several generations old. To avoid unwanted phenotype-
based surprises in the children produced, clinics are carefully 
screening their “white” donors to ensure there is no likelihood of 
recessive genes producing unwanted “low-status,” minority phe-
notype characteristics in the babies produced for white consum-
ers.164 In order to avoid this problem they aggressively screen 
out certain kinds of mixed race persons from their pool of white 
donors.  
4. The Toxic Search for Whiteness  
Gamete providers’ marketing approaches aggravate white 
identity in three concrete ways. First, white persons are encour-
aged to view themselves as genetically different from other racial 
groups. Additionally, white persons are encouraged to imagine 
themselves as similar to a eugenically filtered slice of their com-
munity. Finally, white persons are driven towards donors that 
comport with ideal notions of whiteness in ways that further bol-
ster whiteness’s disciplinary power.165 Each consideration is ex-
amined in turn.  
Typically, clinics allege that they are merely giving white 
consumers the genetic material to re-create themselves when 
they create donor catalogues, but this process of searching for 
sameness is already compromised by the radical pre-screening of 
 
 163. See supra note 84. 
 164. See, e.g., STEPANKA, supra note 16 (indicating that clinic asks what 
“your parents look like” and to provide pictures of family members).  
 165. DAISY DEOMAMPO, TRANSNATIONAL REPRODUCTION: RACE, KINSHIP 
AND COMMERCIAL SURROGACY IN INDIA 96 (2016). 
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the donor samples in the pool. The donor material that consum-
ers are offered are not average white Americans.166 Rather, con-
sumers are being invited into a catalogue of elite whiteness that 
celebrates whiteness in an artificial and surreal form. Indeed, 
because of the structure of the search process, white consumers’ 
understanding and relationship to whiteness and to themselves 
is profoundly shaped as they sort through gametes. Again, con-
sumers are being presented with white donors that are on aver-
age taller, more physically fit, more accomplished, and more tra-
ditionally beautiful than the general pool of white people in the 
United States.167 This experience reinforces a certain inaccurate 
perception of whiteness and invites the consumer to imagine him 
or herself in this group. 
Empirical data screening white consumers’ buying patterns 
is difficult to come by; records of this nature are not easily acces-
sible. However, qualitative accounts and individual stories pro-
vide telling evidence of the search for a certain kind of whiteness 
in the United States.168 Additionally, foreign entities that service 
United States consumers appear to be singularly focused on pro-
ducing white children. Cryos International, a Denmark sperm 
bank with a large number of United States customers, proudly 
boasts that it is the largest in the world.169 It produces 2000 ba-
bies per year with their donors, and “almost all the donors are 
white and blond with blue eyes.”170 Working class white persons 
heavily use the booming fertility tourism industry in the Czech 
Republic, known for providing endless quantities of cheap, anon-
ymously donated eggs from blond white women.171 Simply put, 
working class white people who cannot afford the ART process 
in the United States know they can journey abroad to produce 
white children. Foreign consumers from certain other countries 
show a similar preoccupation with the construction of ideal 
whiteness. In Israel, for example, mothers reportedly have tried 
to sift through the Romanian donors they are given easy access 
to by state-affiliated marketers to avoid donors that are “too 
 
 166. Daniels & Heidt-Forsythe, supra note 2 at 724. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Almeling, supra note 76, at 326 (discussing strong demand for white 
skinned, blond donors); supra note 70.  
 169. See Manzoor, supra note 107. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See generally SPEIER, supra note 27 (describing phenomenon of white, 
working-class North Americans traveling to Central Europe for IVF).  
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dark” or have “Jewish noses.”172 While the state of Israel has its 
own view of whiteness, its citizens seem to disagree as to what 
characteristics are preferred within that construct.173 
Moreover, United States gamete banks sometimes explicitly 
admit that they are inviting their white consumers to purchase 
a superior version of whiteness, rather than simply replicating 
themselves. After a gesture to the typical consumer’s desire for 
aesthetic sameness, websites clearly invite one to look beyond 
one’s partner.174 They suggest that one can look to an extended 
family member or one can shop for gametes based on a desired 
kind of look.175 The donor-selection process could be likened to 
looking at products on Amazon. Consumers are, in general, en-
couraged by gamete banks to shop for genetic superiors: donors 
who possess traits that give the child an advantage in the world, 
including greater physical attractiveness.176 Therefore, while 
there is a professed desire for sameness, there is also ample op-
portunity for white consumers to engage in self-deception or 
cherry-picking between family members when setting an aes-
thetic baseline.177 If a family has a single blond family member, 
or one of the consumers was blond as a child, it is easy to see how 
suddenly blond donors seem credible. 
On the whole, white consumers’ choices during this pro-
fessed search for “aesthetic sameness” suggest that, consciously 
or unconsciously, consumers are reacting to anxiety about 
 
 172. KATHARINA SCHRAMM ET AL., IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE NEW GENET-
ICS, RECREATING CATEGORIES OF DIFFERENCE, AND BELONGING 86 (2012) (dis-
cussing the way Romanian eggs are used to reinscribe Jewish persons’ heritage 
as Slavic or European). In Israeli fertility clinics consumers have expressed con-
cern about the biological source for the eggs being too dark or looking too Jewish. 
Id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. “This is a highly personal question. Do you want to have a child who 
resembles you or your partner, or other members of your family? Is there a ‘look’ 
you are attracted to? Or you just want a healthy baby, and don’t care if he grows 
up to be short or tall, or otherwise different from you?” Choosing Donor Sperm—
7 Things You Should Know, WIN FERTILITY, http://www.winfertility.com/ 
choosing-donor-sperm-7-things-know/ [https://perma.cc/54CK-MET7]. 
 175. Id.  
 176. See How To Choose a Sperm Donor, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, https:// 
fairfaxcryobank.com/how-to-choose-a-sperm-donor [https://perma.cc/3D4X 
-AGR7] (“Our goal is to ensure that you are able to choose from an exceptionally 
large number of sperm donors who are high quality people.”). 
 177. Manzoor, supra note 107, at 2 (sperm purchaser joking that “people see 
what they want to see” when they look at her children). 
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known social risks that accompany marginal whiteness, specifi-
cally low-status, ethnically-marked versions of white identity.178 
Specifically, white consumers understand that there are more 
and less privileged versions of white identity.179 ART allows 
these parents to buy their children the ability to avoid certain 
problems within this privileged identity category. Traits to be 
avoided may include relatively inconsequential variables like 
having a poor singing voice or teenage acne. Other features more 
clearly relate to current patterns of social subordination, includ-
ing looking too “ethnic,” or failing to conform with traditionally 
idealized gender norms.180 White people are disciplined or 
taught by this experience about what types of whiteness are val-
ued and what features are important. When white people engage 
in this search process, they typically enter without full appreci-
ation of the stickiness of this strictly constructed eugenics-based 
world. They emerge from the process with their racial views 
shaped more than they realize, and the long-term effect of this 
intense racial experience is disturbingly unclear.  
5. Anti-Miscegenation Ethos 
Clinics and providers discourage monoracial families from 
purchasing gametes from another racial group in a variety of 
ways. While there is no legal prohibition on cross-racial 
matching in the United States, many consumers report barri-
ers, either when purchasing gametes or when working with 
ART doctors.181 Indeed, certain sperm banks make it clear in 
their marketing materials that cross-racial selection is a prac-
tice that is fraught with danger.182 When gamete banks en-
gage in this kind of messaging, they encourage essentialized 
notions of race and socialize consumers to expect pain when 
 
 178. See generally Rich, supra note 161 (discussing ways in which the expe-
rience of whiteness is fractured for some groups by their possession of features 
perceived to be low status, including ethnicity and sexual orientation).  
 179. Id. at 1516 (describing the concept of marginal whiteness as experi-
enced by some whites). 
 180. Id. at 2010. 
 181. See Fogg-Davis, supra note 14, at 18 (describing barriers faced by con-
sumers when purchasing gametes). 
 182. See Donor Ethnicity, Your Family and Your Future Child, SPERM BANK 
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engaging in race mixing.183 In some cases when the anti-mis-
cegenation message is too explicit, concerns are raised. A Ca-
nadian sperm bank received international attention for being 
too explicit in warning against miscegenation; a doctor em-
ployed there informed his white client that he would not assist 
her in “creating rainbow families” to satisfy her whims.184 And 
while explicit legal prohibitions on race mixing are now rare 
in foreign countries, there is ample evidence that multiple 
countries did have race-based restrictions in the past and con-
tinue to implement them as a de facto matter in certain juris-
dictions.185  
To explore these disincentivizing marketing messages in 
the United States, one can examine sperm bank marketing 
materials. The Sperm Bank of California issues particularly 
extreme and clear warnings, devoting an entire webpage to 
the problems that result when a monoracial family considers 
 
 183. For a discussion of essentialism, see Andrew Sayer, Essentialism, So-
cial Constructionism and Beyond, 45 SOC. REV. 453, 456 (1997). For a debate 
about essentialism in critical race theory, see Kenneth B. Nunn, “Essentially 
Black”: Legal Theory and the Morality of Conscious Racial Identity, 97 NEB. L. 
REV. 287 (2019). 
 184. Jessica Barrett, No ‘Rainbow Families’: Ethnic Donor Stipulation at 
Fertility Centre ‘Floors’ Local Woman, CALGARY HERALD (July 25, 2014) http:// 
www.calgaryherald.com/news/calgary/rainbow+families+ethnic+donor 
+stipulation+fertility+centre+floors+local+woman/10063343/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/F3HT-X4V6] (documenting experience of white woman denied 
access to sperm of a different race, citing a race matching policy it had in place 
since 1980). 
 185. England explicitly prohibited cross-racial matches; it subsequently 
changed its legislation to discourage matches that cross ethnic lines. See Hu-
man Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, c. 22 (Eng.). In Spain, by law, par-
ents are matched by doctors with eligible donors based on the parents’ physical 
“type”; this “type” matching does not, absent special circumstances, permit se-
lection of ova or sperm from a different racial group than the parents. See Law 
on Assisted Human Reproduction Techniques (B.O.E. 2006, 126) (Spain). Can-
ada requires that donors and families be matched using a “best interest of the 
child” standard, under which cross-racial matches are disfavored. Previously 
they were prohibited in Canada under the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 
S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.). Finally, some jurisdictions, like Turkey, wholly forbid for-
eign gametes to be donated or sold to their citizens and can even institute crim-
inal penalties for those that engage in reproductive tourism. See Zeynep B. Gur-
tin, Banning Reproductive Travel: Turkey’s ART Legislation and Third-Party 
Assisted Reproduction, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 555, 555–64 (2011) 
(discussing Turkey’s “Legislation Concerning Assisted Reproduction Treatment 
Practices and Centers”). Often these restrictions have a religious basis but the 
consequences for the racial and ethnic stock of the country are quite clear.  
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a donor that is not from their racial group.186 The clinic ex-
plains that its views are based on thirty years of experience in 
the industry.187 The three primary reasons to avoid this prac-
tice, they explain, are (1) the need for family resemblance, 
(2) the child’s desire for belongingness, and (3) white parents’ 
inability to connect with or understand the minority child’s 
culture or her experiences of discrimination.188 Anecdotal ac-
counts confirm that in many cases doctors or clinics raise 
warnings against crossing racial lines. African American 
women, in particular, report being denied access to sperm des-
ignated as a “different” racial group.189 However, African 
American consumers are the consumers most likely to cross 
racial lines to find donors because gamete providers have very 
few African American donors and often these donors do not 
have the same physical features as the customers requesting 
gametes.190  
As one examines the justifications providers offer to dis-
courage race mixing, one notices that they rest on several as-
sumptions about race relations in the United States that seem 
significant. First, administrators at the California Sperm 
Bank appear to assume that mixed race children will not feel 
 
 186. See Donor Ethnicity, Your Family and Your Future Child, supra note 
182. There is great variation in anti-miscegenation messaging. Some sperm 
banks do nothing more than privilege race as a selection criterion and then dis-
cuss the “natural” impulse to choose someone that looks like you or your family. 
See How To Choose the Right Sperm Donor, SEATTLE SPERM BANK, https:// 
www.seattlespermbank.com/how-to-choose-the-right-sperm-donor/ [https:// 
perma.cc/M4PC-W6TA]. Others are more explicit about the psychological harm 
a child will face when he “looks different” from the family. See How To Find a 
Sperm Donor: Tips for Choosing the Right One, INVITRA, https://www.invitra 
.com/donor-selection/#race-and-ethnicity [https://perma.cc/WC24-QY5U]. The 
webpage for the organization explains: “As it happens with race and ethnicity, 
resemblance is seen as a signal of kinship. A child who shares physical resem-
blance with his parents and the people surrounding him is more likely to create 
a feeling of connectedness instead of unfamiliarity as he grows up.” Id. 
 187. See Donor Ethnicity, Your Family and Your Future Child, supra note 
182. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Quiroga, supra note 30, at 155 (discussing the case in which one Black 
woman was willing to settle for sperm that was racially tangential—with “Afri-
can descent over history and time”—when told that Black donors weren’t avail-
able). 
 190. See Daniels & Golden, supra note 78, at 18 (“Caucasians and Asians are 
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a sense of belongingness in their families. The bank argues 
that most children will crave an environment that makes 
them feel similar.191 This assumption is based on another as-
sumption: that there is no one in the consumer’s wider family 
that is of a different race. It also presumes that the family 
lives in a white habitus, including neighborhood and social 
circle; the guidance assumes there are no other mixed race 
families in the child’s community.  
Cultural arguments also play a role. To further discour-
age consumers interested in cross-racial donation, the Califor-
nia Sperm Bank shares the insights of a white family that 
considered Middle Eastern sperm because the donor’s other 
non-racial characteristics better matched with what the fam-
ily desired.192 After considering the best interests of the po-
tential child, the family decided against choosing sperm from 
a different race. As the mother explained, “it would require us 
to acknowledge the heritage and cultural background that 
would belong to our child, but not to us.”193 Here the clinic uses 
a quote that conflates biology or genetics with culture, even as 
it knows there is no way to genetically transmit culture or 
race. The sperm bank strategically uses the experiences of 
families with transracial adoptees to provide research in sup-
port of its views. Yet a transracially adopted child’s experience 
will be different than a mixed race child produced through an 
ART procedure. The child produced through ART typically 
will have some genetic connection to the parents, and often far 
less of a basis for claims of physical difference. Moreover, chil-
dren actually born in a different country and adopted in their 
tender years may feel a strong bond with their place of origin 
and have a more concrete connection to a particular cultural 
community. Most concerning, the California Sperm Bank 
warns white parents that they will not have the tools and un-
derstanding necessary to help their children negotiate a dis-
criminatory world.194 This observation is highly pessimistic. It 
assumes that (1) discrimination exists in most communities, 
(2) most white families have been happily insulated from and 
ignorant of discrimination dynamics, and (3) these families 
 
 191. See Donor Ethnicity, Your Family and Your Future Child, supra note 
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will be incapable or unwilling to learn how to confidently de-
fend children of color from discrimination.  
In summary, gamete providers sometimes erect formal 
and informal barriers to gamete consumers looking beyond ra-
cial boundaries; their behavior mirrors more concrete legisla-
tive blocks in other countries. The resistance to cross-racial 
matching rests on an essentialized understanding of race that 
reduces culture to biology in indefensible ways and further as-
sumes racial segregation and monoracial families as the 
norm.195 Even banks that do not explicitly direct people away 
from using different-race samples have opportunities to do so 
in informal interactions. Instead of facilitating cross-racial ex-
change, discussing any number of potentially valid reasons 
that a person might look across racial lines, banks remain fo-
cused on emphasizing distinctions between racial categories. 
Concerns about this essentialized approach to race grow even 
more acute in the era of elective race,196 a consideration ex-
plored in more detail in the section that follows.  
D. CONCERNS ABOUT PACKAGING RACE IN THE ERA OF 
ELECTIVE RACE  
 As I have previously explained, the United States is con-
tending with the rise of a new discursive model for racial under-
standings called elective race.197 This Section more closely exam-
ines the racial identification and racial enforcement rules used 
by ART clinics to highlight the problems they pose in light of 
current discursive shifts in the United States in the discussion 
of racial equality.  
In the era of elective race, various institutions, including 
government authorities and market players, are being asked to 
recognize the strong dignity interest individuals claim to have in 
determining their public racial identities, meaning the racial 
 
 195. The Sperm Bank of California seems to assume that the only way to 
avoid dangerous commodification is to reaffirm the separateness and distinc-
tiveness of groups, rather than encouraging responsible selection. See Donor 
Ethnicity, Your Family and Your Future Child, supra note 182.  
 196. See generally Camille Gear Rich, Elective Race: Recognizing Race Dis-
crimination in the Era of Racial Self-Identification, 102 GEO. L.J. 1501 (2014) 
(describing the phenomenon of racial self-identification and its effects on per-
ceptions of race). 
 197. Id. 
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identity each individual is socially recognized as having by oth-
ers.198 The ART market honors this dignitary self-interest by al-
lowing sperm and egg donors to racially self-identify. Yet the 
ART market, first and foremost, is in the business of selling a 
certain promised phenotype—the physical characteristics that 
will ensure that one is socially recognized by others as being 
from a particular racial community. The next round of conflicts 
in the ART market will pit the individual donor’s right to volun-
tary self-identification against the consumer’s right to expect a 
clearly labeled racial product that produces a given racial phe-
notype. To be clear, clinics routinely request donor self-identifi-
cation information as a way of ascertaining whether the donor 
has a certain phenotype.199 Yet the donor’s self-identification 
choice and phenotype may not consistently match. When clinics 
intervene to re-categorize and repackage donors to ensure that 
they choose a racial label that matches their individual respec-
tive racial phenotypes, clinics violate both the self-identification 
rights of the donor and may ultimately deliver a product to the 
consumer that is not racially labeled in a logical or defensible 
fashion. This point deserves further discussion.  
There are two ways a person is racialized in society: invol-
untary ascription and voluntary ascription.200 Involuntary as-
cription occurs when one is socially recognized as a member of a 
given racial group, sometimes without one’s knowledge or con-
sent.201 The most common trigger for involuntary ascription is 
physical characteristics.202 These characteristics are socially rec-
ognized as being linked with a particular racial or ethnic group—
a racial phenotype—and result in an individual being ascribed a 
particular racial identity.203 Each person in each community has 
a particular racial lexicon that causes him to associate particular 
physical features with a given group. Sometimes his lexicon will 
also include so-called voluntary behavior—such as speaking 
styles, modes of dress, or presentation—that also cause him to 
assign persons to a particular racial group.204 However, in the 
 
 198. Id. at 1512–20. 
 199. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 200. See Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrim-
ination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1145 (2004) 
(describing concepts of involuntary and voluntary ascription). 
 201. See id. at 1145–46. 
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 204. Id. at 1158. 
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United States, and in most other countries, phenotype, or phys-
ical characteristics, remain the primary way individuals are ra-
cially identified.205  
The ART market, by encouraging consumers to browse do-
nor profiles and choose physical characteristics, is allowing peo-
ple to shop for racial phenotypes that promise a certain kind of 
involuntary ascription. The ART market promises consumers 
that they can purchase sperm or eggs that will produce children 
that automatically will be identified as members of a particular 
racial group. What consumers are less aware of is that the char-
acteristics presented in donor pictures are not guaranteed. While 
they may know that the donor’s genes will mix with their own, 
this doesn’t necessarily lead to their questioning the link be-
tween the donor’s physical appearance and the donor’s genetic 
code in his or her sperm or eggs. What consumers are actually 
buying in the gamete market is far less sure than it seems. In-
stead they are playing with genetic probabilities in a process in 
which the precise genes that allegedly transmit many phenotype 
features have not yet been identified, and the transmission trig-
gers are unknown. Moreover, each sperm or egg, individually, 
will carry different genetic code with different material from the 
donor.206 To be clear, for some white Americans, not all of their 
sperm would be coded as white. If they have any mixed heritage, 
some portion of the sample may have higher percentages of DNA 
linked with regions of the world that are associated with com-
munities of color.  
Voluntary ascription, by contrast, involves any behavior or 
aesthetic marking that one intends or understands will cause 
others to identify one as belonging to a particular racial group.207 
These voluntary signaling codes include dress, behavior, and 
manner of speaking.208 One of the most important voluntary as-
criptive behaviors in the modern era is what I call documentary 
race.209 Documentary race is established when a person con-
sciously checks off a box on a racial identification form or racially 
identifies herself during an intake procedure; documentary race 
is what sperm and egg providers initially use to categorize their 
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donors.210 When a person approaches a gamete bank with the 
intent of donating, he is asked to fill out a form and go through 
an interview in which he is asked to identify by race.211 There is 
no standard process for the collection of this material. Some 
banks merely ask for current identification; others inquire 
whether one has any mixed heritage for three generations 
past.212 Other banks try to fine tune their judgments by asking 
about ethnicity.213 The goal is to find “racially pure” subjects that 
they can market easily. 
Documentary race has taken on increased political im-
portance in contemporary society, in part, I argue, because of the 
growing number of mixed race persons in the United States.214 
Indeed, multiracial Americans have played a particularly strong 
role in the rise of elective race, as they argue they have a dignity 
interest in ensuring their mixed-race backgrounds are fairly rep-
resented in social life.215 The United States also has received im-
migration from countries that have racial categorization para-
digms that dramatically differ from our own.216 When gamete 
banks ask donors for racial identification information, they run 
headlong into these new forces. They encounter donors that feel 
a strong need to be able to accurately identify themselves ra-
cially.217 Some readers will view these issues as negligible and 
conclude that they do not create a basis for concern. First, they 
would argue, people applying as donors know what racial traits 
customers are actually looking for; they will not risk identifying 
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as white if they are likely to transmit physical features that are 
associated with minorities. Also, they would argue a gamete 
bank retains the discretion to reclassify donors that identify as 
white but are apparently mixed race. The clinic certainly should 
reserve the right to reclassify an individual when he does not 
disclose that he has a minority relative or because he physically 
appears to be mixed.218 However, neither of these assurances 
should prove particularly reassuring as they (1) do not take ac-
count of contemporary elective race understandings, (2) freeze a 
certain interpretation of whiteness and attempt to enforce this 
understanding, and (3) suggest that sperm banks and donors 
will be engaged in practices that smack of eugenicist tendencies 
and the enforcement of the historically antiquated “one drop” 
rule.219  
Also, we know that in the era of elective race, mixed race 
persons with white heritage will sometimes identify as white if 
they are psychologically and economically triggered in particular 
ways.220 These triggers exist in the ART market. There are 
strong economic incentives to identify as white when being 
screened as a donor; stocks are eighty percent white and minor-
ity donors are routinely turned down because there is far less 
demand for their gametes.221 The donor with one Native Ameri-
can or Asian grandmother, who appears white, will have strong 
reasons to classify herself as white. The features potentially pro-
duced by her egg, however, may substantially deviate from her 
current physical appearance. Donors themselves often have lit-
tle understanding of genetics. They merely know that they carry 
genes that likely transmit certain desired characteristics. Do-
nors do not know when the risk of producing less desired char-
acteristics is reduced to a negligible level. Does having one mi-
nority grandparent prevent one from identifying as white? 
Donors cannot be expected to understand how racial phenotype 
is tied to an individual’s genetics; moreover, they might be of-
fended by whatever standard the clinic would use to mitigate the 
risk they pose. 
 
 218. See Gomes Costa, supra note 217, at 106 (noting clinic personnel’s re-
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In addition, it provides little reassurance to allow gamete 
banks to make final determinations about race. Because the 
standards individual clinics use are not transparent, there is no 
guarantee or check on whether they are consistent. There is no 
written guidance on these questions. Instead, individual intake 
workers are called upon to make choices about the mixed back-
ground and appearance of donors.222 Again, fairness and con-
sistency is important here in the era of elective race. One can 
imagine the dignitary assault a so-called “white” donor might ex-
perience when she learns her Asian grandmother now causes her 
to be classified as Asian.223 She similarly might be offended if 
she identifies as Latinx and finds herself reclassified as white 
because the clinic perceives her skin color to make her white de-
spite her Dominican background.224 She might be even more of-
fended if she learns that the clinic’s decision to racially re-clas-
sify her effectively ensures that her samples are rarely seen by 
Latinx families and are only seen by white ones. At present, most 
clinics cannot tell donors how they are racially re-classifying do-
nor samples because they have not established clear, transpar-
ent, and consistent rules about this process.  
ART suits in the era of elective race are likely to take a num-
ber of forms. The first class of suits could sound in the nature of 
fraud and would involve purchasers who buy sperm or eggs that 
produce a child who does not phenotypically match the donor’s 
appearance. This group could involve mixed-race donors who pe-
riodically have chosen to identify as white or minority and have 
chosen, because of financial incentives, to identify as white for 
the gamete-donation process. In this group of cases, the donor’s 
gametes would individually vary a great deal, and therefore may 
produce children who do not appear to be phenotypically white. 
Does the gamete bank have a claim against the mixed-race donor 
for deceit? Does the sperm bank have a right to require that do-
nor to identify as a person of color or must it respect her claim of 
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whiteness? A couple may contract for eggs from a mixed race 
woman with blond hair and blue eyes and have a first child who 
matches that donor’s phenotype. They may order eggs again 
from this individual which produces a child who appears Black. 
Should the purchasers have a claim against the gamete bank for 
fraud or negligence if this information is not known? Should the 
bank have a claim against the donor for fraud if he or she fails 
to properly disclose her mixed race heritage? What if the pur-
chaser has recessive genes that when combined with the donor’s 
DNA cause these unexpected minority phenotype features to 
emerge? 
These problems do not abate if gamete banks begin to ask 
more questions. Instead they will require banks to create their 
own rules for racial identification and make assessments about 
who may be classified as Black, Latino (or Latinx), white, or 
Asian under the bank’s racial identification rules. Courts might 
still find themselves in the position of assessing family “blood 
lines” if family history is used. Alternatively, gamete banks may 
turn to genetic testing, prescreening their donors. However, as 
Section I.C.3 explains, this solution creates more problems than 
it solves because individual gametes contain different combina-
tions of genetic code from the donor.225 A mixed race person may 
produce sperm or eggs in the same collection sample that tech-
nically would produce children classified as different races and 
the race assigned may not match their phenotype.  
The litigation risk posed by racial purity rules have real im-
plications in the era of elective race, making it clear that clinic 
screening practices are in noticeable dis-alignment with current 
racial norms. Instead of shrugging off these reassignment prac-
tices, we should be concerned that clinic intake personnel would 
be changing the racial designations of donors or disqualifying 
otherwise qualified donors merely because of their chosen desig-
nation. Indeed, they have no basis for doing so as race has no 
biological foundation.226 The gamete banks’ attempts to negoti-
ate the discrepancy between phenotype and racial identification 
practices draws our attention to the ways in which the items be-
ing sold in the sperm and egg markets are, at bottom, social con-
structions. Ironically, these racial assignment practices operate 
unchallenged because the ART intake process is not transpar-
ent, and persons inclined to sue are given no reason why their 
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samples were rejected. Those in the small group of chosen donors 
have no incentive to challenge how their materials are racially 
categorized; indeed, they may not even know their samples have 
been re-designated as associated with a different racial group. 
We cannot know if litigation will trigger review of these pro-
cesses, but government still has a role to play. The fast and easy 
exchanges ART marketers are making between racial categories 
raise the specter of consumer confusion, disappointment, and al-
ienation in ways that may complicate the operation of other ad-
ministrative regimes that depend on racial identification.  
The ART industry also has a First Amendment commercial 
speech problem. Government has long exercised its authority to 
regulate commercial speech that is false or materially mislead-
ing.227 These interests are clearly at stake in the ART market 
where questionable representations are being made about the 
products sold. The representations ART providers make about 
race are materially misleading if not patently false. The simple 
exchange of racial phenotype promised by sperm and egg banks 
is not as simple as it appears. First, the websites make no men-
tion of the ways in which racial categorization practices vary be-
tween ART sellers or that sellers exercise discretion in making 
racial categorization decisions.228 Their designations often devi-
ate from the categories used by United States administrative re-
gimes, increasing the risk of confusion. Second, their marketing 
practices suggest that race is biologically transmitted through 
genes, similar to eye color or hair. This is patently false; race is 
determined by personal identification and social reactions to a 
given phenotype.229 Additionally, the precise mechanisms for 
transmitting particular racial-phenotype traits are unknown. 
 
 227. Commercial speech is defined as any speech by a producer which pro-
poses a transaction or characterizes a product intended to be sold, as part of an 
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Last, clinics fail to disclose that the genetic load of a donor is not 
consistently carried in individual gametes: sperm or eggs from 
the same person vary from gamete to gamete. We cannot expect 
consumers to know these facts and the seductive approach clin-
ics rely on, grouping race with other non-transmittable charac-
teristics, such as a love of poetry, causes significant social harm. 
Importantly, ART providers knowingly seduce consumers 
into believing these biological fictions about race and phenotype. 
They invite consumers to check off the precise characteristics 
they are searching for in an attempt to allow them to shop for 
gametes that will deliver particular characteristics. Donors are 
at some point presented with a disclaimer during the search pro-
cess that generally explains that a donor may not always trans-
mit the characteristics advertised in his profile to his progeny. 
Yet this disclaimer is typically so general and subtle that it can-
not cancel out the various advertising mechanisms that encour-
age parties to believe they are securing particular traits. Some 
will argue that ART clinics are allowed to engage in these mis-
leading practices because they are reconstructing for the con-
sumer the same fictions that exist when one assesses various 
partners to identify the person with whom one wants to create a 
child. Indeed, many people will assess the genetic potential of a 
sexual partner if they anticipate having a child with that given 
partner. However, the fictions we entertain in real life take on a 
different tenor when they are mobilized for commercial pur-
poses.230 More honesty is required. We will return to the regula-
tory possibilities created by commercial speech justifications in 
Section III.B.2. 
II.  PURCHASING RACIAL ESSENCE: UNDERSTANDING 
THE BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN 
Sometimes the value of what one has contracted for only be-
comes clear when a contract fails and one loses the benefit of her 
bargain. Part II examines plaintiffs’ accounts of loss in ART law-
suits over racial mistakes in an attempt to more deeply probe 
what it is that consumers believe they have secured when they 
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purchase gametes of a particular race. This discussion drills 
down to uncover the foundations of some of the “innocent” racial 
preferences consumers currently express when making pur-
chases in the ART market. Part II paints a disappointing, if not 
frightening, picture as it reveals that the American ART con-
sumer is fundamentally preoccupied with family status, social 
signaling, colorism, and a reluctance to honestly engage with the 
presence of racism in society. To be clear, rather than raising 
biological arguments about impurity, admixture, or different ge-
netic code, ART consumers in racial mix-up cases singularly fo-
cus on the social cost of having a Black relative. On close review, 
even those interests that appear to be potentially severable from 
our racially discriminatory past are rooted in regressive notions 
of masculinity and femininity.  
A. UNDERSTANDING THE MONORACIAL FAMILY NORM 
As sociologist Sarah Franklin has observed, given the prices 
charged for gametes and ART procedures by the American ART 
industry, it is abundantly clear that something far more valua-
ble than genetic material is being sold.231 Self-replication, self-
realization, and new forms of intimate connection are all being 
negotiated in this process.232 What the ART racial mix-up cases 
reveal is that ART is intended to quietly assist in the perfor-
mance of ideal family life. Parties’ complaints in racial mix-up 
cases are not about blood lines, racial purity, or genes; instead, 
parties’ claims in the racial mix-up cases focus on the symbolic 
tragedy a brown child causes for a white family as they move 
through public life.233 Several scholars have discussed the role 
race plays in the social signaling processes families engage in 
when they enter public space. Together their work renders visi-
ble the social sanctions and benefits that make white ART con-
sumers profoundly preoccupied with maintaining the white 
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monoracial family norm.234 In the racial mix-up cases we are 
given an opportunity to glimpse this larger regime of discipli-
nary power based on ideal family performance. This regime in-
flicts pain for violating the monoracial expectation, and in this 
way ensures whiteness remains a stable and socially advantaged 
racial category.  
In her article, Staging the Family, Clare Huntington ex-
plains how intimate collectives depend on a variety of strategic, 
public behavioral performances, in compliance with certain cul-
tural norms, to communicate their status as a family.235 While 
her work focuses on gender norms and norms associated with a 
nuclear family structure, she notes that gendered family perfor-
mances also contain a racial dimension. Specifically, she 
acknowledges that families’ symbolic performative behaviors in 
public spaces have an intersectional valence: families are typi-
cally performing norms that reflect white heteronormativity and 
traditional notions of white masculinity and white femininity, as 
these constructs reflect certain understandings about financial 
solvency, independence, and caretaking.236 Huntington’s goal is 
to demonstrate how these gender norms and family structure 
norms find their way into the law, but much of her analysis 
paints a picture of the important social dimensions of these prac-
tices, as they effect a kind of disciplinary power over family mem-
bers.237 This discipline takes the form of anxiety about any dif-
ference that meaningfully diverges from expected family norms.  
 
 234. See infra note 247 (listing complaints and lawsuits from white ART con-
sumers). 
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While not framed as a discussion of performativity, Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig’s account of interraciality-based238 and dis-
crimination also provides insight into the overt and subtle social 
sanctions that effectively punish families that violate the mono-
racial norm. In other works, I have attempted to precisely cata-
logue these sanctions and their social effects. These sanctions 
include being subject to base negative animus as well as to ste-
reotyping, experiencing functional blackness—meaning when 
the family is treated as having the same lower status as a Black 
family, as well as being commodified by others for diversity pur-
poses. The most common sanction the family faces is the use of 
the “monoracial gaze”—the refusal of people in public settings to 
recognize the connection between members of a mixed race fam-
ily unit until explicitly instructed to do so.239 By contrast, com-
pliance with the monoracial norm brings forms of pleasure from 
inverse social dynamics: families that comply will experience so-
cial invisibility in public spaces and this social invisibility may 
shield them from government attention. Specifically, compliance 
with the monoracial family norm may insulate families from in-
quiries about potential domestic violence, child abuse, or other 
issues that the government considers to be part of dysfunctional 
family dynamics.240 More generally, they will be met with posi-
tive public recognition, indeed particularly high positive re-
gard.241  
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The dynamics Huntington and Onwuachi-Willig describe 
should be viewed as part of a larger “intra-group” esteem system, 
as described by Richard McAdams.242 The positive social recog-
nition received by families that conform to the monoracial norm 
are effectively a kind of “racial status” payment that, as McAd-
ams explains, is part of a regime for the maintenance of white 
privilege.243 While esteem payments appear to be less effective 
in maintaining white privilege in some areas of social life, they 
appear to still be powerful in maintaining the monoracial family. 
Rates of cross-racial marriage in the United States remain quite 
low.244 White persons remain the group least likely to marry out-
side of their own racial group.245 Recent political events have cre-
ated a context in which these intra-group esteem payments are 
more explicitly discussed by some whites and are more visible. 
What the racial mix-up cases reveal is that these esteem pay-
ments may be a powerful force in the lives of seemingly “progres-
sive” white families as well.  
With this disciplinary regime in mind, this Article will ex-
amine the various harm constructs presented in the ART racial-
mistake cases. The losses include (1) loss of aesthetic sameness, 
(2) loss of family privacy, (3) anxieties related to expected cul-
tural difference, and (4) anxieties regarding possible exposure to 
racial discrimination. Importantly, as we consider the norm-set-
ting function the law plays in protecting against injuries or com-
pensating forms of harm, it is worth considering whether any of 
these fears are worthy of legal concern. As we will see, each of 
these injuries is tied in various ways to the status payment re-
gime that, as McAdams explains, maintains whiteness as a so-
cially privileged category.  
Understandably, the number of ART racial mistake cases 
that are publicly available is small. Sperm banks are not re-
quired to separately record or keep track of these incidents and 
they have strong incentives to settle these claims quickly to 
 
 242. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of 
Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 
1029–30 (1995).  
 243. Id. at 1046. 
 244. Jennifer Lee & Frank D. Bean, America’s Changing Color Lines: Immi-
gration, Race/Ethnicity, and Multiracial Identification, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 221, 
228 (2004) (explaining that on average only about thirteen percent of American 
marriages involve persons of different races). 
 245. Id. at 228–29.  
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avoid negative publicity.246 Also, white parents violate color-
blindness norms in extreme ways when they publicly file suit to 
complain about bearing a mixed race child. However, public rec-
ords show that at least five cases have been filed in the United 
States.247 Many cases have settled, a result which prevents us 
from fully knowing how these parents experienced the losses or 
injuries in their cases. The two most famous cases, Cramblett v. 
Midwest Sperm Bank and Andrews v. Keltz, provide us with a 
window into performance of the monoracial family and its ex-
pected benefits. Because the number of cases covering this issue 
is particularly small, I closely read the complaints that were filed 
and looked for confirmation of the sentiments expressed in other 
places. These sources included ART guidance materials, op-eds, 
blog postings, and other spaces where ART consumers would 
more openly and honestly express their anxieties and reserva-
tions.  
The first published case on this issue, Andrews v. Keltz,248 
was brought in 2007 by a New York couple against a New York 
 
 246. In Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, a fertility clinic mistakenly implanted plain-
tiff African American couple’s embryo into defendant Caucasian mother’s 
uterus along with Caucasian embryo. 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (App. Div. 2000). The 
court granted full custody of the resulting African American child to the African 
American parents and denied visitation to the white parents. Id. at 22; see also 
Bender, supra note 23, at 75. 
 247. See First Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1 (alleging wrongful birth and 
breach of warranty); see also Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363, 373 (Sup. Ct. 
2007) (dismissing biracial couple’s negligence claims based on impregnation of 
mother with sperm from African American donor); Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 27 
(family with twins including one Black child required to give back to Black fam-
ily); Quiroga, supra note 30, at 143 (describing clinic director’s attempt to get 
African American client Laura Howard to get abortion after being impregnated 
with white sperm); White Couple Have Black Twins Through IVF Error, GUARD-
IAN (July 8, 2002), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2002/jul/08/health 
.lifeandhealth [https://perma.cc/KD8F-TFJQ] (discussing two cases, one Ameri-
can and one Dutch, in which a white family is accidentally given “black” sperm). 
Additionally, there have been reports of cases from overseas. Court Dismisses 
Appeal Over IVF Mix-Up, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www 
.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/court-dismisses-appeal-over-ivf-sperm 
-mix-up-8581384 [https://perma.cc/ZHC5-CRCX] (discussing Chinese-Singapo-
rean woman and German-Caucasian man’s suit over mistaken implantation of 
Indian sperm resulting in visibly “dark” mixed race child). The court dismissed 
their claim for damages based on lack of “genetic affinity” on public policy 
grounds. Id. Because these cases are likely settled quickly to avoid negative 
publicity and clinics are not required to keep records of these mistakes, it is 
difficult to assess how common this problem is at present.  
 248. Andrews, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 365. 
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sperm bank. Plaintiffs Nancy Andrews, a Dominican woman 
with “skin coloration and facial characteristics typical of that re-
gion,” and her husband, a man the court described as Caucasian, 
sued a sperm bank for allegedly impregnating Ms. Andrews with 
sperm from someone other than her husband.249 The couple rec-
ognized the error because they concluded that their child had 
“skin, facial and hair characteristics more typical of African, or 
African-American descent.”250 When Ms. Andrews questioned 
the sperm bank about this “abnormality” her doctor reported 
that it was normal and the child would “get lighter over time.”251 
Concerned, the couple purchased an at home DNA kit and dis-
covered the child was not genetically related to Mr. Andrews.252 
Although the complaint alleged loss because of the anxiety asso-
ciated with not knowing what had become of Mr. Andrews’s 
sperm and whether it had been used by another party, much of 
the complaint focused on the racial mistake of implanting Ms. 
Andrews with sperm from an obviously Black donor.253 The cou-
ple’s claims sounded primarily in negligence and fraud, alleging 
loss both from not having a child genetically related to both of 
them and one marked as racially different in prominent ways.254  
The second case with publicly available materials is Cram-
blett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, discussed at the start of this Arti-
cle. Again, Cramblett raised a variety of tort and contract claims, 
alleging that she had been injured by the mix-up in the sperm 
samples at the Midwest Sperm Clinic—a mix-up that resulted in 
her giving birth to a brown child.255 Her complaint can be distin-
guished from the Andrews complaint because it more self-con-
sciously documents the love she has for her child. However, the 
 
 249. Id. (quoting the 11th paragraph of Andrews’s affidavit). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 365–66. 
 253. Id. at 366. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Specifically, Cramblett raised breach of warranty, breach of contract, 
negligence, and gross negligence claims in her Second Amended Complaint. An 
earlier version of the complaint alleged wrongful birth, but was dismissed for 
failure to state a claim. The language of Cramblett’s complaint changed to 
clearly indicate that she valued her child but faced new difficulties she did not 
anticipate. As Cramblett explained, the birth of her mixed race child had “given 
rise to ‘numerous challenges and external pressures associated with an un-
planned transracial parent-child relationship for which [Cramblett] was not and 
is not prepared.’” Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 385, 
868 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (quoting First Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 16).  
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complaint is also notable for the detailed list of burdens and costs 
it documents as associated with raising a mixed race child. 
Cramblett’s goal is to establish that she should be compensated 
because her financial costs are far greater than they would have 
been if she had been given the monoracial family she wanted.256 
Among the injuries she alleged were moving expenses, because 
she lived in a nearly all white community that had elements of 
prejudice, and family alienation, because members of her family 
also might subject the child to discrimination, as well as costs 
associated with exposing the child to the child’s culture and costs 
for haircare.257 Cramblett also complained that she would be 
forced to enter majority black spaces—where she alleged she was 
not welcome—in order to secure various things she believed were 
necessary for her child.258 As one sorts through the two legal 
complaints in these public cases, common themes rise to the sur-
face: issues normally only discussed in private fora and hushed 
whispers among ART clients.  
B. THE LOSS OF RACIAL AESTHETIC SAMENESS 
Both Cramblett and Andrews allege injury because the re-
sulting child in each case did not look like the couple that had 
sought ART services. Indeed, this concern about aesthetic same-
ness is quite common in ART cases as well as online fora and 
other spaces where these concerns are raised. Consumers worry 
that mixed race children will not look like their parents and will 
be subject to public sanction. The Andrews plaintiffs specifically 
complained about the public nature of their injury.259 Cramblett 
similarly bemoaned the loss of the blond, blue-eyed child she had 
contracted for, noting that her family had intended to use the 
same donor again, to ensure that all of the children looked like 
her and her partner.260  
The court in Cramblett did not reach a substantive judgment 
on this issue, but the Andrews Court considered the issue of aes-
thetic sameness more squarely. Specifically, the court ruled that 
bearing an unexpected child of color in and of itself could not be 
a source of injury in an ART case. Rather, the court explained, 
 
 256. First Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 24–26. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id.  
 259. Andrews, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 366–67. 
 260. First Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 15. 
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one cannot be injured by giving birth to a healthy child. The An-
drews court explained “it is a fundamental principle of Anglo-
American tort law that an act contrary to law, which does not 
result in legal harm—injuria absque damnum—is not actionable 
and does not give rise to any claim or cause.”261 The judge ex-
plained that “[t]his court has recognized the ‘very nearly uniform 
high value’ which the law and mankind have placed upon human 
life.”262 Consequently, the court explained “it cannot be said, as 
a matter of public policy, that the birth of a healthy child consti-
tutes a harm cognizable at law.”263 In short, for public policy rea-
sons courts typically reject such claims, as they will not entertain 
the notion that any child is unwanted. Even in cases of ineffec-
tive sterilization or abortion, the court explained, the resulting 
child cannot be a source of damages. The court then proceeded 
to explain that even “disease[d]” children produced through re-
productive care errors could not be a source of damages in that 
jurisdiction, except for specific kinds of harm inflicted during de-
livery.264 Importantly, the Andrews decision plays a key per-
formative role for the court, allowing it to adopt both a pro-life 
and race-blind position in the decision, but one that seems pro-
foundly naïve in terms of contemporary social conditions.  
The Andrews court missed a key opportunity, as it could 
have more directly addressed the social sanctions mixed race 
families face in public life. It is clear from the Andrews’s com-
plaints about the “darkness” of their child’s skin color that they 
are primarily concerned with the impact a visibly brown child 
will have on the family’s public life. Indeed, in every “racial mix-
up case” I reviewed, formal and informal, litigated or settled, the 
parties’ primary complaint about racial admixture was based on 
producing a child that had a different skin color than the par-
ents.265 Parents in the ART cases are mainly focused on colorism, 
 
 261. Andrews, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 367.  
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 368. 
 265. Andrews and Cramblett clearly involve these concerns. Other examples 
hail from domestic and foreign contexts. “Hey Doc, Is that My IUI Sperm?”, FER-
TILITY LAB INSIDER (Jan. 10, 2013), http://fertilitylabinsider.com/2013/01/hey 
-doc-is-that-my-iui-sperm [https://perma.cc/8RAV-EYZM] (discussing fertility 
clinic worker’s fifteen years of experience and explaining that parents typically 
do not charge mix ups in IVF cases unless the child is obviously of a different 
race); id. (describing New York and Connecticut cases involving white mothers 
bearing children of color); see Maggie O’Farrell, IVF Mother: ‘I Love Him to Bits. 
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not aesthetic similarity. These parents believe that a brown child 
will decrease the status of the family, a dignity assault they 
would like to avoid. These complaints signal that the emergence 
of a modern form of discrimination may take hold in the United 
States as it becomes more of a mixed-race nation. The United 
States may be headed towards the same racial fate as many 
Latin American countries. The United States may become a na-
tion of mixed race people that still sanction anyone who has 
brown skin.266 Instead of equality we will usher in a new world 
of near-white privilege, where brown children and families are 
subject to discrimination and light children and families are not. 
To be clear, ART consumers in racial mix-up scenarios are fun-
damentally preoccupied with brownness. Other indicia of poten-
tial aesthetic sameness are irrelevant when a white family is 
presented with an ART-produced child that is visibly brown.  
Additionally, ART consumers’ “aesthetic sameness” argu-
ment seems far less credible when we honestly consider how the 
ART market is currently organized. As Part I shows, consumers 
are picking from a sample of white donors that is taller, thinner, 
 
But He’s Probably Not Mine,’ GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www 
.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/oct/30/ivf-errors-baby-mix-up [https:// 
perma.cc/66BT-ZSL8] (discussing British and United States cases all involving 
parents’ questions when the child was “an unusual color”); cf. IVF Mix-Up at 
Thompson Medical: A Look Back at the Case of ‘Baby P,’ STRAITS TIMES (Oct. 6, 
2016), https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/health/ivf-mix-up-at-thomson 
-medical-a-look-back-at-the-case-of-baby-p [https://perma.cc/NH9Z-857M] (dis-
cussing Asian woman’s rejection of child in racial mix-up case because of its 
white color).  
 266. Tanya Katerí Hernández, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classifica-
tions in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 121–33 (2012) 
(noting discourse about multiracial groups in United States contradicts the way 
these groups have performed in Latin American countries where they have not 
advanced racial progress); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin 
Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1524 (2000) (warning that mixed-race groups have 
functioned as buffer classes in other Latin American countries and have not 
facilitated racial progress); Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of 
Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1709–11 (2000) (warning as to colorism dynamics 
in the United States that favor lighter skin Blacks over darker tone persons); 
cf. Angela P. Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism in 
the New Century, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 52, 59–60 (2008) (dis-
cussing the emergence of color and identity performance, rather than racial cat-
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more attractive, and allegedly smarter than the average con-
sumer.267 If consumers wanted actual sameness they would de-
mand banks stock sperm and eggs from donors who were heavier 
and shorter, but we do not see these trends. Indeed, consumers 
are not looking for aesthetic sameness. At best, they are looking 
for an idealized version of whiteness with some reference to 
themselves.268 In some cases, consumers wholly depart from 
their own appearance to choose physical characteristics they be-
lieve match a celebrity or some distant family member. Also, the 
gamete market is not organized in a manner that allows for an 
honest quest for sameness based on physical features. Gamete 
samples could be organized by the donor’s eye shape or color, 
nose shape, bone structure, and any number of characteristics 
that would better assure facial similarity. Instead, samples are 
organized based on racial distinctions that create random sepa-
rations between donors and consumers truly looking for physical 
similarity.269 Indeed, the ART fora contain numerous examples 
of consumers choosing donors of other races under conditions of 
scarcity because they recognize that a donor from another racial 
category actually resembles one of their family members.270 As 
sociologist Sven Bergmann explains, if gamete markets were 
structured to look beyond skin color and instead focus on actual 
facial similarities, sameness could be better guaranteed.271  
A thought experiment helps bring this home for some read-
ers. One could imagine a selection regime like there is in Spain, 
 
 267. See supra Part I.C. 
 268. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 269. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
 270. See, e.g., Journey 123, Using Egg Donor of Different Race, BABYCENTER 
(Jan. 3, 2014), https://community.babycenter.com/post/a46810456/using_egg_ 
donor_of_different_race [https://perma.cc/H2L7-NAHW] (discussing experience 
of Indian woman married to African American man forced to use white sperm 
because of lack of African American donors). After reassuring this woman an-
other woman disclosed that she is white and her husband is Chinese, but failure 
to locate a Chinese donor led them to select a similar looking Thai donor. Id.; 
see Moonadea, Would You Use Donor Sperm from a Different Race?, WEDDING 
BEE (June 2012), https://boards.weddingbee.com/topic/spinoff-would-you-use 
-donor-sperm-from-a-different-race/ [https://perma.cc/8QRU-788A] (discussing 
willingness to cross racial categories in search for physical similarity). 
 271. “[A]nonymity, resemblance and non-disclosure are related and inter-
twined.” Sven Bergmann, Assisted Authenticity: Naturalisation, Regulation and 
the Enactment of “Race” Through Donor Matching, in (IN)FERTILE CITIZENS: AN-
THROPOLOGICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECH-
NOLOGIES, supra note 44, at 231, 232–34. 
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where donors are pre-matched with consumers based on skin 
color, hair texture, blood type, ethnicity, and a range of charac-
teristics and then delivered a sample chosen by the state.272 
Many United States gamete buyers would chafe at this system, 
based on the view that the government should not have author-
ity to decide what they look like and, further, that they should 
have a chance to supplement their genetic characteristics with 
the best available to give their child the best chance in life. That 
argument abandons any pretense that the consumer seeks aes-
thetic sameness.  
Finally, history is key to understanding this aesthetic same-
ness argument as Americans are the product of a historical leg-
acy that has taught us to ignore facial similarities across color 
lines. For example, when one looks at pictures of Amanda Cram-
blett and her daughter, physical similarity or aesthetic sameness 
is clear to many people; it is even more clear when one is in-
structed to ignore color differences. But why is it then that color 
exerts such a powerful influence that it will cancel out some par-
ties’ ability to see otherwise obvious physical similarities be-
tween parent and child? It appears that the difficulty some peo-
ple have seeing aesthetic similarity between people of different 
skin tones is cultural, social, or political rather than being the 
product of a universal cognitive blindness. Of course historically 
there were harsh social penalties during American chattel slav-
ery when persons explicitly acknowledged facial similarities be-
tween brown slave children and their white property owners/fa-
thers.273 Americans did not acknowledge these family 
similarities across color lines because they often documented 
sexual assault and exploitation by their family members.274 With 
this in mind, it is little wonder that today we tend to look away 
or not notice similarities across skin color. This ability was of no 
social benefit in the past and potentially produced social dangers 
for people that openly discussed such similarities. Social habits 
 
 272. See Law on Assisted Human Reproduction Techniques (B.O.E. 2006, 
126) (Spain). 
 273. See Thelma Jennings, “Us Colored Women Had To Go Through a 
Plenty”: Sexual Exploitation of African-American Slave Women, 1 J. WOMEN’S 
HIST. 45, 60–63 (1990) (documenting consequences of peoples’ recognition of 
shared blood, similarity or connection between master-father and mulatto chil-
dren including sale of both slave child and mother). The Master’s shame when 
these parent-child relationships were revealed was one source of danger; addi-
tional danger was posed by the master’s wife or jealous “legitimate” white chil-
dren. 
 274. See id. 
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and aesthetic understandings are passively absorbed and passed 
down in families. We may still unwittingly be reflecting the re-
siduum of antebellum racial understandings when we refuse to 
see facial similarity across color; we culturally continue one of 
the saddest aspects of our historical legacy. 
In conclusion, when stripped to their core we see that aes-
thetic sameness concerns actually play a much smaller role in 
the ART consumers’ quest for the perfect child than previously 
believed. Rather than aesthetics, it is anxieties about color, the 
trigger for a more modern version of white privilege, that is ac-
tually the key animating force that drives consumer aesthetic 
choices, far more than any other physical feature. Yet, as we will 
see in Part III, there are ways that the ART industry could be 
structured to lessen this phenomenon, rather than amplifying it. 
C. LOSS OF PRIVACY  
The Andrews complaint also raised concerns about the loss 
of invisibility and privacy. As the couple explained, the clinic’s 
racial mistake created “an unending feeling of helplessness and 
despair.”275 The couple claimed to be “distressed by th[e] mis-
take, each and every time [they] appear[ed] in public.”276 They 
further argued that the “confusion, ill ease, depression and emo-
tion [sic] strain and damage [would continue] for the entire life 
of all the parties involved as well as the unnamed siblings, un-
necessary curiosity, questioning & emotional damages all of 
which have yet to be played out & identified.”277 From the cou-
ple’s perspective, the brown child in their family would always 
trigger curiosity, preventing the family from enjoying social in-
visibility—a normal benefit of monoracial white families. As An-
gela Onwuachi-Willig explains, the constant intrusive question-
ing mixed race families face can be exhausting.278 The Andrews 
family appears to understand that the family permanently will 
be subject to additional attention and scrutiny because of this 
difference.  
While these general scrutiny concerns are understandable, 
blog postings and other confidential conversations reveal that 
these complaints mask different privacy concerns. Specifically, 
consumers believe having a child of a different race will either 
 
 275. Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363, 368 (Sup. Ct. 2007). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 366. 
 278. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 233. 
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(1) immediately reveal the use of ART services, (2) raise the spec-
ter of infidelity in the family, or (3) suggest the presence of an 
earlier minority relative. The first concern amounts to the claim 
that interracial sex is so unthinkable in the consumer’s commu-
nity, that people automatically would know that she resorted to 
the ART market. This claim is easily rejected as offensive on its 
face. Indeed, other ART users have confessed their fears that the 
brown child will signal to members of their community that they 
were actually involved in interracial relationships at some point 
in their lives. Yet this concern again confronts us with the reality 
of racial bias in the consumer group. Apparently, some people 
who publicly support interracial relationships do not want oth-
ers to think that they themselves would have a sexual relation-
ship with a person of color. Last, some have argued that the child 
will be interpreted as a signal that the family has some minority 
relative that is simply not on view. This concern seems eerily 
similar to stereotyped notions of the past, such as hiding “black 
blood” within the family unit, or the notion that interracial sex 
must be part of an illicit and temporary union. To the extent that 
consumers’ privacy concerns stem from fears about questions re-
garding pre-existing racial admixture in the family or interracial 
sex, these arguments should strike the reader as deeply trou-
bling. All of these arguments are premised on the need to main-
tain the perception of white racial purity.  
The Andrews family’s sense of injury should seem particu-
larly ironic. It appears that they too believe they live in a com-
munity in which race mixing does not appear natural and, more-
over, where the racial purity of their family was previously clear. 
The court does not appear to agree. Ms. Andrews’s Dominican 
ancestry is an issue for the judge. He does not seem prepared to 
recognize her as Caucasian, distinguishing her from her hus-
band in the opinion as being Dominican and having Dominican 
“coloring.”279 The Andrews family is effectively suing to enforce 
their own definition of whiteness, one which the Andrews court 
apparently did not share. More disappointing, this seemingly 
progressive mixed ethnic family doubles down on whiteness and 
colorism concerns. They want to take part in the intragroup es-
teem system that undergirds white privilege.  
Indeed, even in families where ART practices are more read-
ily apparent and accepted, there is still a preoccupation with 
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white racial purity.280 Gay and lesbian couples cannot biologi-
cally reproduce; their children are produced through ART, 
adopted, or formed through prior heterosexual coupling. Yet 
monoracial white gay and lesbian couples consistently select 
gametes to match their racial group. They tend to select these 
gametes without explicitly referring to race, and instead focus on 
a desire for similar physical characteristics.281 Scholars have 
suggested these queer families may strive for racial invisibility 
as a form of privilege and as a way to avoid “queering” the family 
more than they already have by their same sex union.282 The 
claim is made that these families participate in the monoracial 
family as a way of erasing ART and also placing them more 
squarely within the traditional family.283 Queer families have 
been heralded in other contexts as key players that can trans-
form unnecessarily restrictive understandings of family, 
parenthood, fertility, and genetic relations. Whether queer fam-
ilies function in this way or instead use ART and racial sameness 
to decrease their visibility remains to be seen.284 Again, we see 
that families with progressive politics in some domains are still 
seduced by the racial intragroup esteem system and the status 
accorded the white monoracial family. 
Last, some of the privacy concerns raised in the ART context 
are inextricably tied to gender norms. For some families using 
 
 280. See generally Quiroga, supra note 30 (explaining that there is an as-
sumption of donor racial purity that undergirds ART procedures). 
 281. See Maura Ryan & Amanda Moras, Race Matters in Lesbian Donor In-
semination: Whiteness and Heteronormativity as Co-Constituted Narratives, 40 
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 579, 585–93 (2017). Ryan and Moras note that lesbian 
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preferences are linked to a naturalized nuclear family structure that historically 
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hair texture and eye color as the reason for their choices, simply assuming that 
gametes of the same race will be provided by default and the preference need 
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 282. Lenon & Peers, supra note 9, at 6 (discussing how gays negotiate the 
politics of “homonormativity,” which allows them the gift of invisibility if their 
practices appear consistent with heterosexual norms). They explain that a 
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 283. See Naomi Cahn, The Uncertain Legal Basis for the New Kinship, 36 J. 
FAM. ISSUES 501, 504 (2014) (recognizing the potential for donor constituted 
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 284. See Mamo, supra note 52, at 230–31 (2013). 
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ART, the need to resort to technological assistance creates em-
barrassment. Men fear that they will be viewed as less virile or 
as “failed” men. Women also fear being viewed as infertile be-
cause sterility seems to raise questions about their femininity. 
These concerns about how ART affects social perceptions of mas-
culinity and femininity have historical antecedents. Indeed, gen-
der-based shame was an important consideration at the start of 
the ART industry, during a period when its eugenicist strains 
were more apparent. Doctors treating women for infertility 
feared that people would discover that the father in the family 
was sterile, and this would affect public perceptions of his mas-
culinity.285 Gender stereotyping, rather than having abated, has 
simply been reborn in modern form. Now women hide the use of 
ART because they fear being socially sanctioned for having 
waited too long to conceive or being too focused on career con-
cerns. Both criticisms are used to make career women anxious 
that they have failed to comply with standard femininity norms. 
Also, both genders may face the critique that they waited too 
long to marry when they are forced to use ART. When parents 
ensure that their children produced through ART appear to be 
genetically linked to them, they pursue oppressive idealized no-
tions of gender. In ART and in other domains, these idealized 
notions of gender harm many Americans.  
Finally, consumers’ desire to hide the stigma of ART be-
comes a less persuasive justification as ART usage increases in 
frequency. To be clear, stigma is waning. Given its high cost, par-
ticipation in the ART market tends to be read as a demonstration 
of financial security, or even wealth and privilege. Also, increas-
ingly children born from donor gametes have demanded access 
to information about their donors, compelling parents to reveal 
this information to their children as part of responsible parent-
ing. Although we historically have normalized the desire for se-
crecy about ART, we should consider at what cost. As Karen-
Anne Wong writes, “[r]ecipient parents who choose not to prior-
itize ‘matching,’ and actively disclose the process of children’s 
conceptions, may embark on a project of queering heteronorma-
tive family structures and place great trust in both their own 
 
 285. See generally SPEIER, supra note 27; Daniels & Golden, supra note 78, 
at 8 (explaining that the first woman artificially inseminated in 1884 was never 
told by the doctor and had sperm from his most handsome medical student used 
to produce her child). The primary concern was that men would be seen as less 
virile or masculine if the quality of their sperm was placed in doubt. Id. 
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children and changing social attitudes to reduce stigma and gen-
erate acceptance for non-traditional families.”286 Wong notes 
that many families that are driven by the matching model be-
come profoundly preoccupied with concerns about secrecy, pri-
vacy, and trust.287 Nothing about this arrangement serves the 
interests of the children in the family.288 
D. FEAR OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE  
Cramblett also complained that she was unprepared to raise 
a child in a largely racially segregated world. She worried about 
moving through largely minority spaces to service her daughter’s 
needs.289 Interestingly, in this section of her complaint, she ac-
cepts the naturalness of segregation and operates on the as-
sumption that she would be perceived as a racial interloper in a 
minority community, regardless of the fact that she has a minor-
ity daughter. Cramblett seems to concede that white parents 
learn about minority culture with training, but in her view 
transracial parenting has introduced her to a new and unwel-
come burden in this domain. As she explains, she has “limited 
cultural competency relative to African Americans, and [there is 
a] steep learning curve.”290 In specifying her damages and her 
need for relief, she highlighted that she was politically and cul-
turally ill-equipped to help a child of color navigate the world.291 
With this move, Cramblett attempted to portray her claim less 
 
 286. Karen-Anne Wong, Donor Conception and “Passing” or; Why Australian 
Parents Want Donor-Conceived Children Who Look Like Them, 14 J. BIOETHI-
CAL INQUIRY 77, 77 (2017).  
 287. Id. 
 288. The Andrews family’s complaint is also interesting because it suggests 
that they chose the ART market because of its promise of genetic purity, raising 
the conscious understanding of the interrelation of gamete markets and their 
relative status. As they explain “the parents have been caused to suffer exactly 
what they intended to avoid & exactly what they were NOT promised by the 
process provided by the answering defendant.” Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 
363, 366 (Sup. Ct. 2007). In other words, the adoption market, with its slate of 
potentially racially mixed and genetically unrelated children was an option con-
sciously not chosen in favor of a process that would give them the genetic and 
racial mix they truly desired.  
 289. First Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 24 (complaining that she must “travel 
to a black neighborhood, far from where she lives, where she is obviously differ-
ent in appearance, and not overtly welcome”). 
 290. Id. ¶ 23.  
 291. Id. 
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as a frustrated consumer, and more as a mother now trauma-
tized by the unexpected responsibility of parenting a child of 
color. 
Cramblett’s claim is significant in two respects. First, it 
marks the steady march of neoliberalism into the sphere of par-
enting, showing how the dream of motherhood is often under-
stood through a commercial lens. Specifically, Cramblett’s claim 
is that she has been denied the motherhood experience she con-
tracted for—an experience within the comforting zone of racial 
sameness where she feels capable and valued. This loss is per-
manent and is a direct result of the clinic’s mistake. She is care-
ful to make clear that she does not perceive her child as less val-
uable, but only that she is destined to feel inadequate 
throughout her motherhood experience because of the racial dif-
ference. For example, she cannot brush and style her mixed race 
daughter’s hair in the morning in the same way she imagined 
she would with a white child.292 Any racial expertise or profi-
ciency she has in this area as a white person, grooming “white” 
hair, has been rendered utterly useless. Scholars have com-
mented on this experience-focused trend in marriage, and the 
fact that marital unions grow less permanent as we enter an era 
in which parties treat marriage as a site of self-satisfaction and 
self-realization. Cramblett’s complaint reveals that children too 
have become a vehicle of self-affirmation. The promise is that by 
shopping for the perfect genetic profile one can purchase a cer-
tain parenthood experience that one might otherwise be denied. 
Indeed, some would liken the process of searching for a sperm 
donor to searching through dating profiles, although in sperm 
donor catalogues, there is no risk of rejection from the con-
sumer’s chosen love object. Rather, one is presented with a per-
fect slate of men and women that have no desire or ability to turn 
an interested party away. 
Importantly, Cramblett’s complaint about cultural unfamil-
iarity is not plucked from the ether; it is specifically encouraged 
by certain ART marketing materials. Specifically, Cramblett ar-
gues that, as a white woman she does not have the background 
to educate her child about minority culture.293 We have already 
discussed the way this argument conflates culture with biology 
and assumes that people of color operate in separate spheres 
from white Americans. The argument gives short shrift to the 
 
 292. Id. ¶ 24. 
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convergence of culture in the United States; in many ways Amer-
icans are linked by a profound cultural sameness instead of ra-
cial difference. To be clear, if a family fears using a Black donor 
because they do not know anything about Kwanzaa or 
Juneteenth, they should consider the fact that many African 
American communities don’t actually celebrate these holidays. 
If they believe these holidays are important, they can certainly 
create opportunities for children to have these African American 
holiday experiences in the same way that children from cultur-
ally non-observant African American families do. Also, a 
properly supported child may actively request these experiences 
on her own, allowing her to actively participate in creating her 
own racial identity.  
E. OUTSOURCING DISCRIMINATION CHALLENGES  
Finally, Cramblett alleges damages because of the chal-
lenges she will face as she tries to help her child navigate race 
discrimination. One source of harm stems from the fact that she 
must now abandon the monoracial white community she moved 
to in order to relocate in a more diverse community.294 She ex-
plained in her Complaint that she had moved to the white com-
munity because it was a “better” living environment and had bet-
ter schools.295 Importantly, Cramblett uncritically accepts the 
fact that white enclaves for unstated reasons seem to have supe-
rior access to government services as a standard background 
norm. Equally important, she complains that she will have to 
consult with multiple therapists and experts to learn more about 
how to navigate raising a biracial child, to make sure that intol-
erance and discrimination do not affect her daughter’s academic 
or psychological well-being.296 She suggests that parents of color 
have special skills and can educate children about how to iden-
tify and respond to racism better than white parents. Also, part 
of her trauma stems from the fact that she is aware of how intol-
erant her family is of her sexual orientation; they had explicitly 
instructed her to cover or mask her difference as much as possi-
ble.297 The race mixture in her immediate family will now only 
make her seem even more different, more odd to her extended 
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family than she did before. She realizes that her daughter cannot 
cover her source of difference and try to blend in as Cramblett 
has; as a consequence, her daughter will be sanctioned by the 
extended family even more. Moreover, Cramblett’s own unfamil-
iarity with issues of race makes her even more anxious that she 
will not be able to help her child.298 As she explains, she did not 
meet any African Americans until she attended college.299  
While Cramblett’s empathy for her child is understandable, 
this is insufficient reason to subsidize racial segregation in the 
ART market. Her argument amounts to the claim that minori-
ties must learn about discrimination from other minorities to 
survive. Americans committed to racial equality should be of-
fended by the claim for two reasons. First, her argument con-
cedes the permanence of racism as a social fact. Second, she out-
sources responsibility for negotiating racism as a social 
inconvenience that should primarily be borne by minority fami-
lies. It is hard to imagine an argument that is more socially irre-
sponsible than this claim. Antidiscrimination education efforts 
strongly encourage white Americans to acknowledge racism and 
participate in dismantling this problem. Admittedly the unex-
pected presence of a multi-racial child sometimes triggers other-
wise uninterested white Americans to become committed to  
antidiscrimination efforts, but this is a positive development. In-
deed, white wealthy couples suddenly exposed to the realities of 
discrimination are often extremely well positioned to challenge 
racism. As they are enlightened about how discrimination con-
cretely affects minority children’s life chances, they are more in-
clined to challenge discriminatory structures, and they will do so 
from a position of privilege. Recently social media focused on a 
video produced called “The Talk” in which minority parents 
talked to their children about how to negotiate racism.300 White 
parents can certainly give “The Talk,” but they also will some-
times be far more influential than minority parents in actually 
changing white schools, workplaces, and other spaces that have 
discriminatory dynamics.301  
 
 298. Id.  
 299. Id. ¶ 22. 
 300. See Procter & Gamble: ‘The Talk,’ WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/video/business/procter-and-gamble-the-talk-ad/ 
2017/08/04/52345b76-7940-11e7-8c17-533c52b2f014_video.html. 
 301. Stories have also surfaced of children of color raised in white families, 
subject to racism, and their families confronting that racism with surprise but 
defiance as well.  
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Review of the complaints raised in racial mix-up cases 
shows that the performative family is alive and well. The com-
plaints demonstrate that, rather than biological or genetic con-
siderations, monoracial white families are profoundly concerned 
with the role race plays in public social signaling. Moreover, the 
complaints raised in the racial mix-up cases suggest that the dis-
ciplinary regime for maintaining the monoracial family may ra-
ther strongly endure in spaces where whites in other respects 
support diversity and other non-discriminatory values. Both of 
the plaintiffs in these cases are mothers experiencing anxiety, 
fear, and/or discomfort about the prospect of introducing a visi-
bly brown person into the family. One plaintiff is a member of a 
gay partnership; the other is a member of a mixed ethnic (and 
arguably mixed race) union. Progressives who sympathize with 
these individuals’ concerns can easily imagine similar macro and 
microaggressions within their own families if they attempted a 
cross-racial match in the Art process. People express surprise, 
alarm, or curiosity at the decision to take a non-white partner or 
have a non-white child.302 Yet avoiding these moments of dis-
comfort is a key reason why white privilege and monoracial fam-
ilies endure. In short, when plaintiffs complain in the racial mis-
take cases about the symbolic disruption a mixed race or 
minority child causes, they render visible the continuing power 
of a white intra-group esteem system that helps maintain the 
white monoracial family norm.303  
 
 302. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 233, at 138–55. 
 303. To be clear, a white person’s desire for social status, or the desire to 
escape mockery, questioning, or discomfort is not the innocent nondiscrimina-
tory moment it seems. This persistent desire to remain invisible is key to the 
American regime of racial subordination. The special status and social recogni-
tion accorded the monoracial family is a result of our prior commitment to a de 
jure monoracial system. It is worth noting that we are a mere fifty years after 
state anti-miscegenation statutes were declared unconstitutional in Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Older relatives who lived most of their lives against 
a legal backdrop shaped by de jure segregation of this nature have raised chil-
dren in homes where the monoracial family was a clearly required aspect of 
appropriate behavior. Honoring these families’ preferences, avoiding upsetting 
their expectations, and internalizing their expectations is a key vehicle for neg-
ative racial animus and stereotyping to continue.  
 
2446 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2375 
 
III.  CHARTING A WAY FORWARD 
A. GENERAL GOALS AND STANDARDS  
Parts I and II demonstrate that the racial classification sys-
tems used in the ART market promote discredited notions of bi-
ological race and lay a fraudulent scientific patina over their pro-
cedures; encourage racial stereotyping, racial determinism, and 
racial anxiety; and promote racial segregation. Given these ob-
servations, under a functionalist inquiry race clearly is not serv-
ing a valid purpose in the ART market and, the ART market in-
stead actively undercuts the Unites States’ racial equality 
norms. Part III considers the means federal and state govern-
ments could use if they attempt to disrupt current racial mar-
keting in the ART industry. This Part explores measures that 
function as direct prohibitions solutions that exceed nudges, as 
well as more gradual nudge-like incentive measures.  
Certain themes are common and shared by all of the 
measures described below. First, all of them reflect the equal 
protection values and norm that should inform Supreme Court 
review in this area. Indeed, they specifically reflect the antibal-
kanization norm that I believe will be the prevailing value the 
Supreme Court uses in its review assessing the constitutionality 
of proposed ART market restrictions. Numerous equal protection 
scholars have taken note of the Supreme Court’s tolerance of ra-
cial categorization in regimes in the affirmative action context, 
while the Court broadly decries the dangers of racial labels in 
other venues. This shift, according to Reva Siegel, represents a 
transition to an antibalkanization approach to equal protection 
law: racial categories are tolerated in the affirmative action con-
text precisely because they are being recognized in a way that is 
designed to disrupt racial segregation dynamics.304 Scholars like 
Siegel have generally worried about the Court’s steady march in 
the equal protection cases towards an anti-classificationist logic. 
As Siegel explains, this anti-classificationist logic is part of a val-
ues project, making colorblindness a central equal protection 
norm.305 However, as the Court marched down this dangerous 
 
 304. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An 
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1279, 
1352–55 (2011) [hereinafter Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization]. 
 305. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anti-
classification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1470 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The 
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997). 
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anti-classificationist path, Justices have consistently argued 
that this approach is necessary to avoid racial subordination and 
segregation—their primary goal. 
Importantly, Siegel and other scholars had long argued for 
an anti-subordination approach in Supreme Court doctrine—one 
which permits the State to recognize and create racial distinc-
tions under regimes that have the goal of disrupting racial hier-
archy.306 However, because the anti-subordination logic scholars 
have offered has not commanded the support of today’s more con-
servative Supreme Court, efforts must turn to whether antibal-
kanization justifications can be remobilized to create a basis for 
the same anti-subordination policies that progressive scholars 
believe are essential to prevent the exploitation and marginali-
zation of minority groups. To be clear, at present, antibalkaniza-
tion principles are embraced by the Court. Most racial classifica-
tion systems fail to survive strict scrutiny unless they meet 
certain antibalkanization goals: the goal of diversity, cross-racial 
learning, and racial exchange.307 These values are recognized 
when they are part of regimes that do not compromise the inter-
ests of whites or burden majority racial interests. The question 
is, are there regimes and spaces where arguing to dismantle ra-
cial labels actually do appear to serve anti-subordination pur-
poses in the way progressives would hope? This Article cannot 
fully explore these questions, but it offers for consideration one 
space where an anti-classification ethos reduces marginalization 
and stereotyping in ways that would satisfy anti-subordination. 
Kenji Yoshino similarly sees this antibalkanization logic be-
hind the Supreme Court’s shift away from an equal protection 
analysis when examining the interests of vulnerable minori-
ties.308 The Supreme Court instead prefers treating vulnerable 
 
 306. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 114 HARV. L. REV. 747, 
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and the limits of the antibalkanization approach, see generally Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination: A 
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ualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781 (2006); Siegel, From Colorblindness to 
Antibalkanization, supra note 304; Yoshino, supra note 306. 
 308. Yoshino, supra note 306, at 751. 
 
 
2448 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2375 
 
minorities as individuals seeking vindication of due process lib-
erty interests.309 The Court has expressed a desire to avoid the 
Lilliputian-multiplication and hierarchical ranking of minority 
groups that might be recognized under equal protection law. A 
liberty analysis seems superior to certain Justices, he explains, 
because it confirms the minority litigants’ right to pursue certain 
kinds of freedom without making arguments about the specter 
of illogical discrimination.310 Scholars are now being called to ex-
plore how these liberty justifications and individual arguments 
also might attend to some of the same concerns central to the 
anti-subordination paradigm. I suggest that there are a range of 
liberty arguments and consumer freedom arguments that can be 
mobilized in support of marginalized communities interests’ in 
the ART market. 
In short, I suggest that the Court’s anti-classificationist ori-
entation and its anxiety about balkanization heralds positive 
treatment for the arguments I raise in Section B.311 For most of 
the proposals in Section B address how my proposed ART regu-
lations are designed to disrupt the existing racial categorization 
practices in ART markets to promote greater consumer freedom 
and reduce stereotyping. These regulations are designed to pre-
vent the clear establishment of separate racial groups, reduc-
tionist evaluations based on race, and inappropriate nudges to 
racial considerations during family formation decisions. Addi-
tionally, the reforms I previously proposed for the ART market 
are framed in terms of individual donors’ and consumers’ core 
liberty interests rather than being group-based concerns. My 
central claim is that donors and consumers should not have their 
aesthetic choices constrained by the arbitrary racial categoriza-
tion rules imposed by ART providers. Prohibiting or discourag-
ing the use of racial labels and categorization is sure to increase 
cross-racial intimacy and exchange. Consumers themselves are 
then left in the position to make determinations about race with 
regard to each candidate, and how important race is in light of 
their other characteristics. Also, in the absence of clear racial 
labels, parties will be less likely to resort to stereotypes about 
features, characteristics, and capacities erroneously associated 
with particular races. Whether courts and legislators are driven 
by anti-subordination or anti-classificationist logic, individual 
 
 309. Id. at 751–52.  
 310. See id. at 792–97 (discussing the advantages of liberty-based claims). 
 311. Infra Part III.B.  
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liberty, or antibalkanization considerations, all can find reasons 
to support the interventions offered below.  
Indeed, to remedy the problems caused by the past use of 
race, we need antibalkanization measures that encourage ART 
consumers to abandon biological concepts of race and look be-
yond racial categories. Additionally, we need antibalkanization-
based measures that address some of the equal access problems 
minority gamete donors and minority ART consumers face. To 
achieve this end, the proposals below encourage ART clinics to 
stop organizing gamete donors into distinct racial groups. They 
incentivize the development of ART marketing materials that 
cause parties to look beyond racial categories and to recognize 
race as a social construction. Ultimately, some of these measures 
ideally will encourage consumers to privilege donor features 
other than race-associated phenotypic traits. At a minimum, the 
measures are intended to disrupt the ART market’s current in-
vitation to ART consumers to celebrate an ideal construct of 
whiteness and disrupt the market’s active discouragement of 
race mixing. Skeptics may claim there is little quantitative evi-
dence to establish that ART consumers are willing to look across 
racial lines when buying gametes, but evidence does suggest that 
ART marketers have great power.312 Marketing features and 
market structuring features, if properly designed, can nudge 
consumers to acknowledge that the features they assume fall 
within one racial group are actually shared. Also, evidence sug-
gests ART consumers are price sensitive, more open to nudges in 
conditions of scarcity and will look past racial lines.313 These fea-
tures make it likely that there is room to change the market with 
properly structured policy initiatives.  
B. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS  
1. Banning Foreign Imports and Foreign ART Services  
The first proposal is most effectively instituted by the fed-
eral government. Americans could be prohibited from importing 
gametes from foreign countries for use by ART clinics in the 
 
 312. Looking across racial lines for phenotype-based similarity is already 
part of the ART industry in some other countries. See New Delhi Surrogacy 
Clinic, Egg Donor in India, YOUTUBE (Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=hdVy38ko72E (showing a doctor from the New Delhi Sperm Clinic of-
fering Asian women the opportunity to use Indian eggs from a region of India 
where people “look quite Asian”). 
 313. See sources collected supra note 270. 
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United States. Alternatively, the government could prohibit 
Americans from using foreign ART services altogether. The more 
direct result of the foreign import rule is that it disrupts Ameri-
can consumers’ global search for white gametes and restricts 
them to a potentially more diverse American gamete pool. Con-
sequently, it will have clear positive effects on race markets. As 
Part I shows, much of the foreign trade for eggs and sperm comes 
from places with idealized white phenotypes, including blonde 
hair, blue eyes, and light or fair complexions. These foreign do-
nors find United States consumers willing to import frozen eggs 
and sperm from places like Denmark and the Czech Republic, 
with the hope of producing ideal white offspring. Importantly, 
other countries have instituted restrictions of this nature and in 
this way control the genetic stock available within their coun-
tries. However, because the United States already has a diverse 
population, restricting American consumers to United States 
gametes would not produce any one race; it would not start a 
eugenicist trend. Specifically, United States restrictions would 
not facilitate an understanding of our country as monoracial nor 
specifically encourage the growth of certain populations within 
our borders. Instead, Americans would be trapped in the diverse 
gamete pool in the United States. Clinics currently have rules 
that limit the number of times a sperm donor may donate to en-
sure that only a limited number of genetically related children 
are produced by a single donor. Egg donors also face limits be-
cause of the intrusive nature of egg retrieval procedures. Be-
cause of the scarcity these donation limits create, ART clinics 
would ultimately begin to market a larger cross-section of ra-
cially diverse donors to their clients. Even if clinics took steps to 
increase the number of white American donors, there would in-
evitably be a more diverse cross section of white donors in their 
catalogues to ensure that clinics can fully meet their customers’ 
demand for quality gametes. In short, the domestic gamete re-
striction may make ART clinics relax or even abandon their cur-
rent racial categories and racial purity rules.  
The restriction on foreign imports has multiple advantages 
beyond its potential to disrupt racial marketing in the ART in-
dustry. Policymakers could justify the foreign import restriction 
as necessary to protect the American ART industry and keep 
American dollars at home. Additionally, American ART consum-
ers, forced to contract within the United States market are likely 
to bring the costs of ART services down. ART providers will com-
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pete to provide this newly captured consumer base with reason-
ably priced services. One of the advantages of this proposal is 
that it is not didactic: it does not directly tell consumers what 
race their sperm or egg donor should be. The proposal also does 
not prevent consumers from creating a child that looks like 
them. This proposal merely makes it more likely that American 
ART consumers will consider a more diverse donor pool during 
the gamete search process. This measured proposal, combined 
with some of the commercial speech proposals described below 
could substantially change American consumers’ understanding 
of aesthetic similarity, phenotype, and race.  
2. Commercial Speech Restrictions 
Restrictions on foreign imports will be far more effective if 
coupled with new commercial speech restrictions governing ART 
clinics. Clinics should be required to post a series of warnings 
and disclaimers about race given the substantially misleading 
misrepresentations they make about race in their marketing ma-
terials. These warnings and disclaimers could include the follow-
ing: (1) there is no genetic basis for race, (2) the precise genetic 
transmission mechanisms for many phenotypes/features are not 
known, (3) the phenotype/features of a given donor are not guar-
anteed to be present in the donor’s gametes, (4) definitions of 
race vary from clinic to clinic and may be changed without notice 
to the consumer, and (5) preferred physical characteristics may 
appear in multiple different racial groups. This disclaimer re-
gime may prove to be attractive because it does not restrict or 
limit consumer choice. Instead, the disclaimer regime attempts, 
through a process of repetition, to destabilize consumers’ under-
standings about race in a way that enhances consumer free-
dom.314 The more prominently these disclosures appear on web-
sites or in ART materials, the more effective they are likely to be 
in incentivizing consumers to look outside of so called racial cat-
egories when searching for gametes. For example, because many 
consumers search for gametes online, these disclaimers could be 
programmed to flash on websites with regularity as a consumer 
searches for a donor. 
 
 314. See generally Jennifer J. Argo & Kelley J. Main, Meta-Analyses of the 
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The disclaimer proposal is a minimally intrusive way to en-
sure the government’s racial equality message is heard in some 
form by ART consumers. There is some research suggesting that 
disclaimers or warnings can trigger opposite effects in those ex-
posed, because of the allure of tainted fruit and illicit behavior.315 
However, this research examined behavior such as consumption 
of unhealthy products;316 by contrast, dismissal of antidiscrimi-
nation messages is only likely to spur pride or produce pleasure 
for already highly discriminatory consumers. It is more likely to 
produce discomfort and feelings of hypocrisy in our target con-
sumer group—those that have at least superficially embraced di-
versity values but failed to fully conform their behavior to these 
values.317 While the tenor of recent racial politics in America 
have shifted to naturalize xenophobia and even claims of white 
racial superiority for a slice of Americans, these messages still 
create a level of cognitive dissonance for many others, as we now 
have been socialized for decades to embrace racial equality 
norms. Admittedly more research in this area would be helpful. 
At this juncture it is enough to suggest that electronic antidis-
crimination nudges, triggered by how a website is constructed, 
 
 315. The success of a disclaimer strategy will depend in part on the moral 
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could disrupt the currently naturalized racial eugenicist over-
tones in the ART industry.318 Explicit messages may be very ef-
fective as well.319 Research suggests that disclaimers and warn-
ings issued in close proximity to when an action is contemplated 
can be extraordinarily effective in changing behavior.320 Again, 
these disclaimers and warnings do not limit consumer choice; 
they merely encourage consumers to broaden their search pa-
rameters.321 This innovation is not present in other countries.322 
Rather it is specifically based on the United States’ long history 
under the commercial speech doctrine of addressing fraudulent 
or materially misleading marketing representations.323  
Some may argue that the disclosure proposal is an unconsti-
tutional imposition of compelled speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.324 However, given the current strength of the gov-
ernment speech doctrine and recent cases requiring various in-
dustries to both pay for and display government messages re-
lated to industry conditions,325 this disclosure or warning 
requirement is likely to survive constitutional scrutiny.326 ART 
clinics, of course, should be permitted to frame the disclaimers 
 
 318. See supra note 315. 
 319. See Harmon & Rudd, supra note 315. 
 320. Ross Buck & Rebecca Ferrer, Emotion, Warnings, and the Ethics of Risk 
Communication, in HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY 693, 694–718 (Sabine Roeser 
et al. eds., 2012) (explaining that although the analytic cognitive aspects of ef-
fective warning have been closely studied, to be truly effective these warnings 
must command attention, stimulate memory, and evoke emotion).  
 321. See Daniels & Golden, supra note 78, at 19–20. 
 322. See Terms of Use, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/ 
about-website/terms-use/ [https://perma.cc/DE2Y-85A6]. 
 323. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ADVERTISING AND MARKETING ON THE INTER-
NET: RULES OF THE ROAD (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
plain-language/bus28-advertising-and-marketing-internet-rules-road2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S2FD-RQUQ]. 
 324. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 
355 (2018). 
 325. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 
2253 (2015) (recognizing that wording on government issued license plates con-
stituted government speech despite some citizen participation in choosing avail-
able mottos and messages); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 
553–55, 567 (2005) (recognizing as constitutional a beef industry taxation 
scheme used to fund government messages encouraging beef consumption even 
though beef producers were not able to control the messaging from the govern-
ment). 
 326. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (discussing 
government speech doctrine). 
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in ways that ensure consumers know the disclaimers are govern-
ment messaging.327 Over time these disclaimers may fade in sig-
nificance like the health warnings displayed on cigarettes;328 
however, in the near term they are likely to profoundly shape 
the ART gamete “shopping” experience. Importantly, this pro-
posal does not go as far as wholly prohibiting the use of race in 
ART materials.329 Wholesale prohibitions on commercial speech 
based on race are highly likely to trigger inquiry as a content-
based restriction on speech, subject to strict scrutiny.330 While 
one would assume that our equal protection commitments are 
sufficient to qualify as a compelling or highest order state inter-
est, the inquiry might still fail to meet the requirement of narrow 
tailoring. For these reasons, a disclaimer strategy is the better 
option. 
3. Public Subsidies  
The government has substantial latitude to spend money to 
hire speakers to communicate its message under the government 
speech doctrine.331 Additionally, the government may use its 
spending power to support the provision of services that have an 
expressive dimension.332 The Supreme Court has recognized 
that government cannot possibly be viewpoint neutral as it 
chooses which services to fund.333 As Justice Scalia has ex-
plained, “[g]overnment must [be free to] choose between rival 
 
 327. Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and 
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 615 (2008) (“[O]ne of the problems posed 
by mixed speech is the risk that the public will not spot government advocacy 
and will therefore fail to hold the government accountable for its viewpoint.”). 
 328. FDA Proposes New Health Warnings for Cigarette Packs and Ads, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/ 
labeling-and-warning-statements-tobacco-products/fda-proposes-new-health 
-warnings-cigarette-packs-and-ads [https://perma.cc/VPH6-QZU9] (“Research 
shows that today’s warnings have become virtually invisible.”). 
 329. See Fox, Choosing, supra note 14, at 14.  
 330. Id. 
 331. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 
208–09 (2013). 
 332. Id. at 221 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating the government may enlist 
private parties to pursue policy goals and speech connected with those goals 
that may be content specific); id. (“The First Amendment does not mandate a 
viewpoint-neutral government. Government must choose between rival ideas 
and adopt some as its own.”). 
 333. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005). 
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ideas and adopt some as its own.”334 Both of these sources of au-
thority suggest that the federal government could offer subsidies 
to ART providers that do not use race to categorize or market 
gametes.335 Government officials can easily explain that the 
State has an interest in supporting clinics that operate in a race-
neutral fashion as these clinics reflect the colorblindness or race 
neutral norms that the State believes are part of the Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection guarantee. Government subsi-
dized ART providers would be directed to ensure that individual 
donors are not reduced to mere representatives of a given race 
in the donation process, and that clinics should not produce mar-
keting material that privileges race in donor descriptions.336  
Also, many countries use public subsidies and other govern-
ment mechanisms to communicate their views about ART. For 
example, countries like Israel currently use public subsidies to 
shape ART usage, providing full reimbursement to ART consum-
ers for certain services.337 In addition, the government has set 
up relationships with certain Romanian sperm and gamete pro-
viders to provide genetic material to Israeli couples.338 The norm 
the state hopes to project is the importance of the family in Is-
raeli society.339 A subsidy regime in the United States would, by 
contrast, be designed to reflect antibalkanization and racial 
equality values we hold dear. Subsidies for ART may be closer to 
reality than many people realize. As birth rates in the United 
States fall to levels below the population replacement level nec-
 
 334. Agency for Int’l Dev., 570 U.S. at 221 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 335. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (discussing government’s in-
terest in ensuring service providers enlisted to implement government pro-
grams will deliver messages tailored to be consistent with the goals of such pro-
grams; cf. Agency for Int’l Dev., 570 U.S. at 221–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that message sought to be conveyed by government as part of the 
program was not properly tailored to the purposes of the program and violated 
the service providers’ First Amendment rights).  
 336. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (finding de-
nial of tax exemption to school that engaged in race discrimination satisfies 
strict scrutiny given compelling interest in eradicating race discrimination). 
 337. See Dapha-Birenbaum-Carmeli, Thirty-Five Years of Assisted Repro-
ductive Technologies in Israel, 2 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE & SOC’Y ONLINE 16, 17 
(2016) (discussing how fertility treatments in Israel are publicly funded).  
 338. See id. at 19 (discussing how most Israeli recipients of donor eggs would 
be happy to receive Romanian eggs). 
 339. See id. at 21 (discussing how the state’s funding demonstrates its sup-
port for “traditional biogenetic families”). 
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essary to maintain healthy economic growth, reproductive sub-
sidies may grow more attractive for economic reasons.340 
As explained above, federal or state governments should 
limit these subsidies to programs that disrupt the current racial-
ized marketing practices used by the ART industry.341 First, they 
could offer grants to gamete banks or ART clinics that do not 
group donors by race or ethnicity. These entities instead would 
allow customers to search for certain physical features in a pro-
cess that ensures that the consumer is provided with a sample 
that contains multiple highly appealing donors of different races. 
Further restrictions would heighten the possibility that consum-
ers will combat their tendency to discriminate based on skin 
color.342 For example, a gamete bank could limit the number of 
samples a consumer is presented to choose from within a period 
of time, perhaps ten donors per month. Alternatively, the pro-
gram could be structured to provide subsidies directly to consum-
ers that purchase their gametes from providers that do not group 
samples by race and ethnicity. ART clinics and gamete banks 
would likely change their practices in order to capture these con-
sumers. Under either regime, consumers will inevitably be con-
fronted with donors of different races that are highly appealing 
and physically similar in surprising ways.  
Moreover, even consumers that end up choosing sperm or 
egg donors that are phenotypically white will be better off as a 
consequence of having shopped in a system for gametes that em-
braces a colorblindness norm. After repeated experiences looking 
at donor samples that compel them to look across race, these con-
sumers are likely to see the potential of donors in other racial 
groups that they otherwise would have never seen. Additionally, 
ART consumers are invited into an exercise that causes them to 
see similarity across race, which is an antidiscrimination exer-
cise that benefits us all.  
 
 340. America’s total fertility rate today stands at 1.93, according to the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention and hasn’t been above the replacement 
rate in a sustained way since the early 1970s. Jonathan V. Last, America’ s Baby 
Bust, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 12, 2013, 4:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424127887323375204578270053387770718 [https://perma.cc/5FRN 
-N2UN]. This creates a dual problem—a population that is disproportionately 
old and shrinking overall. Id. The phenomenon has enormous economic, politi-
cal, and cultural consequences. See id. 
 341. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 342. See supra Part I.C.4. 
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The subsidy program described above is specifically de-
signed to express long-celebrated American antidiscrimination 
norms.343 Claims of compulsion are unlikely to be persuasive, as 
the state or federal government will be paying providers to de-
liver its message, and ART clinics or consumers are free to de-
cline the subsidies and continue to purchase and sell reproduc-
tive services as normal. Similarly, consumers who wish to search 
based on race and ethnicity can forgo government support; how-
ever, again, since they are not wholly prohibited from finding a 
donor that is phenotypically similar, the government subsidy 
program will likely be highly appealing. Additionally, to the ex-
tent the program makes ART services more broadly available to 
all racial groups, it will eliminate the current class-based eco-
nomic barriers that have discouraged minority use of the ART 
market.344 Others may be concerned that the wealthy will opt 
out of this subsidy regime and continue to purchase gametes 
from allegedly pure blood white donors.345 Certainly, some peo-
ple will opt out; however, their insistent desire to search for gam-
etes based on race is likely to cause some embarrassment if dis-
covered publicly. Assuming their desires remain private, race-
focused consumers will operate in a far smaller market for choice 
and end up negotiating private contracts. Most ART clinics will 
likely be eager to court the government subsidies rather than 
service this smaller group of customers.  
4. Taxes 
Other scholars have proposed that taxes can be used to sanc-
tion consumers who buy gametes based on race. For example, 
Dov Fox has proposed that we impose a “sin tax” on these con-
sumers, similar to the kind imposed on persons that purchase 
cigarettes or alcohol.346 There are some concerns with this model. 
As an initial matter, sin taxes no longer communicate the same 
negative social sanction they did when these taxes were created. 
For example, the moral opprobrium originally associated with 
 
 343. See Fox, Choosing, supra note 14, at 5–6. 
 344. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 346. Fox, Choosing, supra note 14, at 13 (“A sin tax is an excise on certain 
goods and services—like tobacco, alcohol, and gambling—that aims to convey 
disapproval and deter consumption of the practice in question.”). 
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tobacco and alcohol seems an antiquated notion today.347 Sin 
taxes are more aptly described as measures that recognize an 
individual’s personal right to engage in unhealthy habits but 
also recognize the state’s interest in recouping costs it suffers as 
a result of this unhealthy behavior.348 The message projected by 
sin taxes is tolerance, rather than judgment; these taxes func-
tion as a clear acknowledgment of each consumer’s personal free-
dom.349 These propositions make sin taxes an ill fit for discour-
aging the use of race in ART markets. The government will want 
to send a much clearer message of disapproval for this commer-
cial behavior. Also, it seems unfair to blame ART consumers for 
shopping in a racialized regime they did not create. These con-
sumers are triggered by ART marketing to make racial decisions 
when choosing eggs and sperm,350 and taxes therefore should be 
directed to ART marketers rather than consumers themselves. 
If taxes are imposed, legislatures should use the tax revenue col-
lected to subsidize efforts that tend to deracialize the ART indus-
try. The money could be used to help defray the costs of a subsidy 
program that funds gamete banks that do not use race or subsi-
dize consumer purchases when they buy through a system that 
does not segregate based on race.  
At this juncture, the ideal level and form of government en-
forcement is unclear, as both state and federal authorities have 
a genuine interest in regulating in this area. The federal govern-
ment’s interest and power stems from its commerce clause 
power, as the ART market is an interstate and intercontinental 
distribution networks for gametes.351 This commerce clause 
power, coupled with the federal government’s constitutional ra-
cial equality guarantees justify regulations that disrupt racial 
 
 347. See Alcohol Facts and Statistics, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & AL-
COHOLISM, https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/brochures-and-fact-sheets/ 
alcohol-facts-and-statistics [https://perma.cc/69AZ-83P8] (last updated Feb. 
2020) (stating that according to the 2018 National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health, 70 percent of people ages 18 or over drank alcohol in the past year, and 
55.3 percent drank alcohol in the past month). 
 348. Fox, Choosing, supra note 14, at 13 (explaining how sin taxes are aimed 
to “convey disapproval and deter consumption of the practice in question”). 
 349. See id. 
 350. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 351. See National ART Surveillance, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (May 7, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/KDM9-SMP7] (describing how the CDC collects data from all fertility 
clinics across the United States and monitors ART). 
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marketing in the ART industry. The federal government addi-
tionally has First Amendment interests that allow it to com-
municate a racial equality message.352 However, states also have 
a strong interest in regulation. Historically they have exercised 
broader discretion to regulate reproductive freedom in the ART 
market, citing their expansive police powers.353 State regulators 
could argue that markets in race compromise the welfare of mi-
nority citizens by encouraging dynamics that lead to discrimina-
tion, and raise their own constitutional commitment to racial 
equality. States additionally could raise concerns about mislead-
ing commercial speech or their own First Amendment speech in-
terests. For some, state regulation proves a more attractive op-
tion because states are regarded as legislative laboratories that 
can develop policy initiatives later adopted at the federal level.354 
States can also better reflect the views of the local communities 
most affected by a particular policy, a key benefit when legisla-
tion touches on potentially divisive moral and ethical issues. 
Therefore, although the majority of the proposals outlined ap-
pear to be federal initiatives, some may conclude they could be 
more effectively implemented by state legislatures.  
5. No Action  
Finally, we could simply continue on our current path. 
Courts appear to be primed to rule that contracts exchanging 
race in the ART market are unenforceable. Specifically, the An-
drews court already ruled in an earlier racial mistake case that 
one cannot secure damages for “wrongful birth” in cases where 
ART providers have made a “racial mistake.”355 Cramblett’s 
 
 352. For more than a decade the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
government has its own independent speech interests that must be respected. 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (recognizing local 
government’s right not to display monuments in order to protect its own speech 
interests). For these reasons the Court has rejected initiatives that would cause 
the government to be associated with messages that might convey support for 
racial bias. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015) (rejecting permissions to create state sponsored 
specialty license plates making use of the confederate flag).  
 353. MEYER, supra note 42, at 5–6. 
 354. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 387 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (explaining how states can “serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”). 
 355. Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d. 363, 369 (Sup. Ct. 2007). 
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claim was not well received and died in a haze of procedural com-
plications.356 There has been no decision, based on breach of con-
tract or negligence that has granted a family relief based on un-
expected racial mix-ups in ART cases.357 However, the specter of 
non-enforcement will have little impact on the ART industry. 
Consumers do not know these contracts are potentially unen-
forceable. They believe they have entered a valid contract for the 
purchase of gametes that will produce a child of a given race.358 
Clinics also settle and provide some payout on these contracts to 
avoid media attention, making government non-enforcement a 
secondary consideration. Finally, given how rare these cases are, 
it makes little sense for gamete providers to abandon highly prof-
itable racialized marketing practices. Therefore, we should not 
expect judicial non-enforcement of these contracts to be a strong 
corrective measure. The proposals I have outlined above are 
based on the understanding that government must do more than 
merely decline to enforce private contracts exchanging “racial 
products” if it intends to truly change the racial register of the 
ART market.  
C. CRITIQUES AND CONCERNS  
1. Limits on Government and Respect for the Right of 
Intimate Association 
Some scholars may be persuaded that some customers’ race 
preferences in the ART market are driven by rank stereotyping; 
however, they worry that the state and federal government 
agencies are not in the right position to attempt to disrupt inti-
mate racial preferences in any direct fashion. Specifically, while 
Dov Fox, Russell Robinson, and Liz Emens are all in agreement 
that in some cases intimate connections based on race are in part 
caused by prior de jure arrangements and may reflect unfair 
race-based generalizations, they also agree that affairs of race 
and the heart are a complicated space that is not easily legis-
lated. Moreover, they all agree that these race preferences may 
 
 356. See supra Introduction. 
 357. See supra note 32. 
 358. See supra Part I.C. 
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be traceable to multiple justifications of varying levels of legiti-
macy.359 These alternative justifications and concerns are dis-
cussed in more detail below. 
Robinson urges some limited, voluntary changes to discour-
age race-based intimate selections: counseling web designers to 
reconsider exactly how they are using race, for example.360 He 
explains that designers of websites that give users the oppor-
tunity to generally sort by race should think critically about how 
web design can facilitate unfair stereotyping—a concern 
squarely at issue in the ART context.361 Indeed, as he explains, 
when regimes give one the ability to choose descriptors based on 
“race,” they are encouraging stereotyped perceptions about what 
people of a given race look like.362 Instead, he prefers selection 
regimes that give users more time to think about variation 
within a “race” category, to make finer, more exact physical de-
scription choices, and avoid stereotyped judgments about racial 
categories that fail to attend to physical diversity.363 In this way, 
he might be a fan of the aspects of my marketing regime that 
gave clinics economic incentivizes to design websites in this way.  
Unlike me, however, Robinson stops short of advocating for 
explicit legal rules or subsidies that incentivize website opera-
tors to wholly take race out of the filtering choices available on 
intimate connection websites. As he explains, there are reasons 
apart from rank stereotyping that might cause one to prefer 
someone within her own race and avoid cross-racial interac-
tion.364 Yet, the reasons Robinson would allow for racial filtering 
focus on an individual’s possession of certain kinds of racialized 
knowledge, specifically a person’s understanding of racial mi-
croaggressions, or a desire for intimacy based on a shared racial 
perspective about certain kinds of discrimination.365 These argu-
ments seem less persuasive in the ART context. Rather, when 
 
 359. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in 
the Accidents of Sexual Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009); Fox, Choosing, 
supra note 14; Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic Prefer-
ences, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2787 (2008). 
 360. See Robinson, supra note 359. 
 361. Id. at 2795–97 (describing range of options in how race might be used, 
ways in which importance of race might be minimized, and ways to avoid ap-
pearance stereotyping). 
 362. Id. at 2796–97. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. at 2798–2800. 
 365. Id. 
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parents select gametes to produce progeny, the potential chil-
dren will not be born with any innate sense of racialized 
knowledge or authentic experience of discrimination—issues 
that he believes might justify racial sorting in other intimacy 
spaces. To the extent the child’s physical characteristics trigger 
the parents to confront more race discrimination in society, the 
children give families an important opportunity to acquire cer-
tain kinds of racialized knowledge and forge a shared family per-
spective on race. These families will have more open conversa-
tions about what he calls perceptual segregation—different 
racial experiences in perceiving bias.366 However, this is a key 
set of conversations. My argument suggests that having these 
conversations about perceptual segregation is an important part 
of advancing racial equality.  
Liz Emens also urges us to tread lightly. She recognizes that 
Americans have not taken full consideration or full responsibil-
ity for the structural issues that create so-called private prefer-
ences for intra-racial or same race intimate relationships.367 And 
while she prefaces her argument by explaining that she is only 
concerned with romantic intimacies,368 some of her insights bear 
on the way the market is shaped for ART as well. Specifically, 
Emens notes that there might be special justifications for gov-
ernment working to encourage interracial intimacies because of 
its prior role in preventing these relationships from forming.369 
However, she explains that symbolic interventions that express 
support for these relationships, even explicit moves to remove 
social barriers, will be perceived as social engineering and could 
backfire.370 Furthermore, like Robinson she worries that inter-
ventions to promote cross-racial intimacy ignore important con-
siderations disempowered groups have for maintaining racial 
distinctiveness.371 It is not enough to call these groups’ intra- 
racial desires “defensive . . . responses” to racism, she explains, 
as the desire to avoid assimilation and maintain distinctiveness 
are true values worthy of respect and consideration.372  
 
 366. Id. at 2788. 
 367. See Emens, supra note 359, 1340–43. 
 368. Id. at 1312. 
 369. See id. at 1379–81. 
 370. Id. at 1397. 
 371. Id.  
 372. Id. at 1347. 
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I agree with Emens that a desire to avoid assimilation and 
maintain distinctiveness deserves respect, particularly when 
raised by disempowered groups that have had their expressive 
project and dignity compromised by rank discrimination.373 
However, Emens reveals a thin conception of race in these argu-
ments. For as minority groups are well aware, out-marriage and 
the interracial children produced often do not result in assimila-
tion or a weakening of minority identity.374 Rather, because race 
is very often a matter of individual choice and affiliation, the 
mere decision to cross racial lines in seeking out sperm or eggs 
does not mean that the child produced will necessarily look like 
or identify with the more socially powerful racial group with 
which she is linked. Rather, in cases where phenotype associated 
with a marginalized group is more pronounced, cross-racial ART 
actually potentially broadens the circle of persons recognized as 
minority. At least in the ART context, cross-racial selection, or 
selection that does not wholly de-privilege race, leaves open the 
question of what racial identity the resulting offspring from the 
ART process will choose.375 To be clear, government intervention 
here, by limiting the use of race, does not usher in the dilution 
or weakening of opportunities for voluntary racial affiliation or 
the articulation of racial identity. Instead it gives individuals 
more opportunities to reconsider how family racial identity is 
formed.  
2. Gaming the System and the Use of Private Markets  
Some will argue that any measure that prohibits the use of 
race in the ART market only invites surreptitious behavior. They 
rightly note that some consumers will actively work to circum-
vent any system that prevents consideration of race in gamete 
selection or exit any market that prevents them from making 
 
 373. Id. at 1397. 
 374. See Sarah E. Gaither et al., Monoracial and Biracial Children: Effects 
of Racial Identity Saliency on Social Learning and Social Preferences, 85 CHILD 
DEV. 1, 20 (2014) (finding that racial identification of biracial children is sus-
ceptible to situational and psychological factors). “Out-marriage” is marriage 
outside of one’s race or ethnic group. See out-marriage, COLLINS DICTIONARY, 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/out-marriage [https:// 
perma.cc/TS3Q-CMGE]; out-marriage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outmarriage [https://perma.cc/ 
JWT3-RUPU].  
 375. Id. 
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race-based choices.376 Certainly, we should assume that these 
forms of exit and resistance will occur, just as in every other com-
mercial market where there are limitations placed on consumer 
freedom. However, most of my proposals do not prohibit parties 
from achieving racial aesthetic sameness if that is what they 
want. My proposals merely incentivize consumers and clinics to 
use other distinctions in the donor search process that more 
closely match with consumers’ claims that they want mere aes-
thetic similarity. Even if we assume that some consumers exit 
the primary gamete market and enter into small, individual pri-
vate contracts to secure gametes from white donors, some posi-
tive results still arise. First, the majority of consumers will re-
main in the primary market and they will not be socialized 
through the current racially-loaded ART marketing experience 
which celebrates whiteness in a particularly aggravated fashion. 
Shame will prevent many from exiting the primary system; 
white persons that insist they need a racially segregated market 
will be viewed critically by their peers over time. Also, consum-
ers that do exit in favor of a secondary market will still never be 
socialized through the current racially loaded ART gamete mar-
keting experience. They also will find it time consuming, compli-
cated, and difficult to court desirable individual donors. Lastly, 
a person who willfully finds ways to search for gametes based on 
race will be forced to face her/his level of investment in a racial-
ized society. This understanding alone could lead to more honest 
engagement when thinking about racial inequality more 
broadly.  
3. The Death of Consumer Freedom—Restrictions on the 
Right To Reproduce  
Some critics will argue that attempts to limit ART consum-
ers’ racial choices constitute an unfair infringement on the re-
productive freedom of consumers.377 Here, again, the claim is 
weak as the systems I have proposed merely encourage consum-
ers to focus on physical features as they appear across groups 
rather than having their searches constrained by a false racial 
construct. Also, consumers are not being denied freedom by 
these measures; they merely are being encouraged to look more 
 
 376. See supra Part I.C.4 (discussing how ART consumers tend to want 
whiteness when making their donor selection). 
 377. But see Roberts, supra note 13, at 798 (highlighting the way these ar-
guments are used to protect ART vendors from regulation). 
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broadly at a larger class of donors. At worst, consumers are being 
denied marketing materials and procedures that describe the do-
nors in factually inaccurate and reductionist ways.378 The right 
to ART services has never been understood to guarantee to con-
sumers the right to have information presented in a particular 
fashion.379 Indeed, when viewed from this perspective, consum-
ers’ demand to have a gamete market structured around race 
seems a mere customer preference, a de minimis concern that 
does not limit procreative freedom in any substantive fashion.  
4. Inconsequential Effects  
Some may argue that that the changes proposed here will 
not do much to disrupt race discrimination in ART markets.380 
Families that want white skinned, blond, and blue-eyed donors 
will continue to highlight search features that give them pheno-
typically white donors. Even those that search for characteristics 
that might overlap with other groups will continue to choose the 
white candidates they are offered.381 The various proposals I 
have offered allow for the fact that this may be true. I do think, 
however, that there is more reason for hope than might initially 
be assumed. Anecdotal accounts and qualitative data have 
shown us that consumers will cross racial categories because of 
the high cost of securing same race gametes, scarcity, and be-
cause they happen to encounter a different race donor that look 
similar to someone in their families.382 Under the subsidy pro-
gram, ART clinics should be required to provide a mixed race 
sample to anyone who approaches the clinic for services. Clinics 
 
 378. Polina Vlasenko, Desirable Bodies/Precarious Laborers: Ukrainian Egg 
Donors in the Context of Transnational Fertility, in (IN)FERTILE CITIZENS: AN-
THROPOLOGICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECH-
NOLOGIES, supra note 44, at 197; Emily Thomas, Fertility Clinic Tells Woman 
She Can’t Use Sperm Donor from Another Race, HUFFINGTON POST (July 28, 
2014, 2:33 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/calgary-sperm-donor-race_n_ 
5627382 [https://perma.cc/2BRT-DBWS].  
 379. See supra Parts I.A–B. 
 380. Some will argue that these protocols will merely cause colorism to take 
over the ART market, rather than race. These concerns are credible, but color-
ism does not operate in a stable fashion. Individuals that have phenotypes that 
allow them to claim membership in multiple groups often operate in ways that 
tend to break down racial barriers and do not respect “color” based divisions.  
 381. See Ryan & Moras, supra note 281, at 593–94. Ryan and Moras note 
that lesbian couples may not explicitly acknowledge their preference for same 
race gametes, but they highlight issues like hair texture and eye color and as-
sume gametes of the correct race will be provided by default.  
 382. See supra Part I.C.4. 
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that currently offer face matching services may deliver the ART 
consumer a sample that produces certain revelations about sim-
ilarities across race, even if the consumer ultimately chooses a 
sample from within his or her own racial group. Moreover, the 
most doggedly biased people will choose white donors that do not 
look like them, merely because of hurdles to accessing their ideal 
sample. This experience as well could prove to be a learning op-
portunity. They will be confronted with the ways their rigid 
views on race prevent them from securing many of the favorable 
attributes they hoped for in their child.  
5. Claims of Discrimination  
Some may argue that my proposals are naïve regarding the 
dangers mixed race and minority children face when born into 
white families that have a strong preference for white children. 
They may worry that minority children born into families that 
prefer whiteness are destined to be mistreated. Several thoughts 
are responsive to this concern. First, white families are not a 
monolithic group. Some couples that choose to search for white 
gametes merely do because they are triggered to think race is 
critically salient by the search procedure. They also do so be-
cause they are actively discouraged by ART marketers from 
crossing racial boundaries. Additionally, the genetic tie consum-
ers will often have to the children they produce through ART 
should prevent mistreatment. Lastly, consumers will still be 
paying significant costs and enduring uncomfortable medical 
procedures to produce a child through ART. They are unlikely to 
go through this process if they truly do not want a mixed race 
child. Instead of discrimination, mixed race children are more 
likely to have parents who are naïve about discrimination and 
parents who may not be fully prepared to talk to a child about 
discrimination.383 They will face perceptual segregation issues. 
Resources should be provided to families that seek help in navi-
gating these challenges. We should recognize, however, that 
these are exactly the same problems mixed race children face 
when they are raised in white households and neighborhoods.384 
 
 383. See 11 Things To Know Before Having Interracial Kids, 
MIXED.UP.MAMA, https://mixedracefamily.com/10-things-to-expect-before 
-having-children-in-your-interracial-marriage [https://perma.cc/UR2G-3L64] 
(discussing how raising interracial kids can be new territory for parents). 
 384. See id. 
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Children facing these challenges will not be alone, and responsi-
ble parents will find means for them to connect with minority 
friends or relatives.  
6. Claims of Distortion Effects—The Death of Race  
Some will argue that the proposals I have outlined effec-
tively call for the death of race or that I have transformed the 
ART process into an engine for producing mixed race children, 
however, this critique seems overblown. Only approximately two 
percent of children born in the United States are produced 
through ART.385 Biological reproduction is still the norm and 
most children will be born through biological reproductive pro-
cedures.386 To the extent the ART process produces more mixed 
race children, I do not think this is a source of concern. So-called 
race mixing has always existed but has not been acknowl-
edged.387 Individuals historically were forced to adopt more re-
ductionist labels that reduced attention to mixed race status.  
My proposals do try to dismantle the notion of biological 
race—the idea that race is genetically transmitted. My proposals 
instead recognize race as a social fact and a lived condition. Race 
increasingly is determined not by phenotype—as there are more 
phenotypically ambiguous individuals and these individuals 
make a range of racial identification decisions. Race in the social 
and political sense is defined by multiple factors: practice, bodily 
marking—such as tattoos or other changes—political choice, 
public recognition, and voluntary claiming.388 In a more concrete 
sense, we must recognize that children born through ART may 
 
 385. See Saswati Sunderam et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveil-
lance—United States, 2016, 68 MMWR SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 1, 6 (2019), 
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Rico were produced through ART procedures in 2016). 
 386. See Gretchen Livingston, A Third of U.S. Adults Say They Have Used 
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expressed through visible bodily differences that signal internal differences). 
 
2468 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2375 
 
not necessarily identify as white, even if they have some of the 
same features as their white parents. Rather, racial identity de-
cisions for these children should proceed as they do for most 
other mixed race persons—as the product of experience, expo-
sure to discrimination, and exposure to cultural forms. Racial 
identity should be based, as it always has been for mixed race 
persons, on a combination of involuntary ascription based on 
phenotype, voluntary affinity, and political context. While these 
processes create alarm for some parties, they are a sign of racial 
progress and the breaking down of clear racial lines. Mixed race 
children born into white families have the right as they reach 
adulthood to determine the particular racial labels they will in-
dividually claim. This is an important and individual growth ex-
perience and their choices should not be predetermined for them 
decades earlier by an anonymous worker in a lab.  
CONCLUSION 
This discussion began by analyzing Jennifer Cramblett’s 
claim of “racial mistake” and asking whether an award of dam-
ages for the ART clinic’s error is a threat to American antidis-
crimination norms. Our exploration of clinic marketing practices 
provides new context for understanding Cramblett’s perspective. 
She is not a backwards symbol of outdated racial thinking or a 
throw-back to an old racial era; rather, she is a creature of con-
temporary racial norms promoted by the ART market, a market 
that encourages her to think that certain racial products are her 
“just due” as an ART consumer. Viewed from this perspective, it 
seems clear that Jennifer Cramblett is not really the person who 
should be sued in the court of public opinion. Our critical gaze 
instead should focus on the invisible hand that has shaped the 
ART market into a place where race is a product for purchase. 
Our criticism should be targeted to communities that continue 
to respond to racialized marketing initiatives, and the reticence 
of friends and family that watch others form race-based family 
formation contracts without raising concerns.  
With a better understanding of current marketing practices 
in the United States ART market, America’s laissez-faire ap-
proach to the use of race is profoundly troubling. With a better 
understanding of buying patterns we see more clearly how the 
ART marketing process encourages troubling views about white-
ness itself and stokes white Americans’ racial anxieties. The 
ART market is perhaps the first stop in a longer journey in de-
termining how American society is still structured in ways that 
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affirm the monoracial family and the way law is still being in-
vited to participate in enforcing the monoracial family norm.  
This discussion shows that we can address the tough ques-
tions the ART market poses without compromising the ART ex-
perience for the consumer. Reproductive freedom and freedom of 
contract will not be lost if we reform gamete marketing practices 
and strongly limit or prohibit the use of race. Rather, there are 
ways to accommodate consumer choice and still act in a fashion 
that is consistent with our antidiscrimination norms. Elimina-
tion of racial classifications increases choice for the American 
ART consumer, allows sperm and egg banks to have more di-
verse gamete stores, and invites market players to imagine new 
ways to court ART consumers. I suggest that there is more con-
sensus in this area than one might imagine. Much can be 
achieved within these shared areas of agreement. These conver-
sations however require that we not hide behind the language of 
“innocent” private preferences, for the loss of innocence is neces-
sary to achieve our racial equality goals. 
 
